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Abstract 
 
The trend of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the United States clearly shifted downward 
after the Great Recession of 2008. This shift indicates that the cause of the Great Recession was 
a change in a fundamental factor that had the potential to significantly affect the steady state. In 
this paper, I examine three possible causes for the shift: a change in technology, a change in 
preferences, and a sudden malfunctioning of the price mechanism. I conclude that an upward 
shift of the expected rate of time preference is the most likely cause of the Great Recession. In 
addition, I estimated the yearly expected rate of time preference of the United States and found 
that the expected rate of time preference shifted upwards by 1–2 percentage points when the 
Great Recession began. I also estimated the expected rate of time preference for Japan and 
found that the rate increased prior to the extended period of economic stagnation during the 
1990s. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Great Recession that began in about 2008 had lasting impacts on the U.S. economy. The 
most significant impact is the apparent downward shift of the trend in gross domestic product 
(GDP). The trend here means the exponential growth path that best fits the data. The trend in 
GDP after 2009 has not yet returned to the pre-recession trend (see Figure 1). Any explanation 
of the cause of the Great Recession should therefore be consistent with this observed 
phenomenon (see Martin et al., 2015). Many explanations of the Great Recession have been 
presented, although not a few of them are narrative (e.g., Guerrieri and Lorenzoni, 2011; Hall, 
2011; Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012; Mian and Sufi, 2012; Christiano et al., 2015; Martin et 
al., 2015). Many of these studies particularly emphasize financial factors, but most of these 
explanations seem to be rather superficial because the apparent downward shift in the GDP 
trend indicates that some fundamental factor changed around 2008; that is, the steady state 
shifted substantially. Any explanation, therefore, should include a change in a fundamental 
factor that has the potential to shift the steady state to a large extent. In theory, these 
fundamental factors are limited to technology, preferences, and the price mechanism, so the 
Great Recession must have been a phenomenon generated by a change in technology or 
preferences, or a suddenly malfunctioning price mechanism. 
 
Figure 1: Logarithm of real GDP in the United States 
(2009 dollars) 
 
Source: National Economic Accounts, the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
 Studies on changes in technology and malfunctions in the price mechanism (i.e., 
technology shocks and frictions) have a long history, and a huge amount of research has been 
conducted on these topics. It is doubtful, however, whether a technology shock or some sort of 
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price friction was the cause of the Great Recession because sufficiently persuasive 
micro-foundations of either a large technological regression or persistent (e.g., over several 
years) malfunctioning of the price mechanism have yet to be presented. 
 A change in preferences has remained relatively unexplored (or rather neglected) as a 
source of large economic fluctuations because economic researchers have generally held the 
conviction or preconception that preferences must be temporally unchangeable. However, 
temporal invariability of preferences has not been proven, and there have been theoretical and 
empirical studies that have indicated that preferences, particularly the rate of time preference 
(RTP), are temporally variable (e.g., Böhm-Bawerk, 1889; Fisher, 1930; Uzawa, 1968; Epstein 
and Hynes, 1983; Lucas and Stokey, 1984; Epstein, 1987; Parkin, 1988; Obstfeld, 1990; 
Lawrance, 1991; Drugeon, 1996; Becker and Mulligan, 1997; Frederick et al., 2002). 
 Using Harashima (2014a, 2014b) as a basis, I examined the problems associated with 
the explanation that the Great Recession was caused by a change in preferences and show that 
these problems can be solved. An important point is that it is the expected RTP of the 
representative household (RTP RH), not intrinsic RTP RH, that matters in economic activities, 
and expectations by nature can change as relevant new information is obtained. A second 
important point is that households behave intrinsically non-cooperatively. This nature generates 
a Nash equilibrium that consists of strategies that generate Pareto inefficient payoffs, and this 
path can generate a high unemployment rate, which was observed during the Great Recession. 
Given these points, I conclude that an upward shift of RTP is the most likely cause of the Great 
Recession. 
 Finally, I estimated a time-series of the RTP RH of the United States to validate the 
above conclusion. The estimates indicated that the RTP RH of the United States did indeed shift 
upwards by 1–2 percentage points when the Great Recession began. This empirical result 
supports my theoretical conclusion. In addition, I estimated the RTP RH of Japan, and the 
estimates indicated that the RTP of Japan shifted upwards by 2–3 percentage points just before 
Japan fell into the economic stagnation of the 1990s. 
 
2  THE SHIFTING GDP TREND 
 
2.1  The apparent GDP trend shift after the Great Recession 
Figure 1 clearly indicates that the GDP trend in the United States shifted downwards around 
2008. What kind of shock can explain this large downward shift? Many superficial reasons have 
been presented, but from a theoretical point of view, such a large shift must be caused by a 
change in a fundamental variable or element, because GDP would soon return to the 
pre-recession trend if the shift was caused by one or more non-fundamental factors. This lasting 
change indicates that the steady state must have shifted. As stated in Section 1, the only 
fundamental variables and elements that can significantly affect steady states are technology, 
preferences, and the price mechanism.  
 
2.2  Suspected causes 
Hence, the cause of the large downward shift of the GDP trend (i.e., a large shift of the steady 
state) should be explained by one of the following reasons: (1) a large regression in technology, 
(2) significant friction to price adjustments, or (3) a large change in a preference. Explanation 
(1) is a supply-side explanation; that is, if technology notably regresses, production will be 
greatly reduced. Explanation (2) is a demand-side explanation; that is, if the price mechanism 
does not work well, demand cannot necessarily match supply and thus production will be 
reduced. Explanation (3) is also a demand-side explanation. If preferences of households change, 
the steady state will shift and the level of production will change. 
 Some researchers may argue that there are other possible explanations, such as 
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phenomena known as indeterminacy, multiple-equilibria, or sunspots. There are many types of 
multiple-equilibria models that depend on various types of increasing returns, externalities, or 
complementarities, but they are vulnerable to a number of criticisms (e.g., insufficient 
explanation of the switching mechanism; see, e.g., Morris and Shin, 2001). These explanations 
may be interesting from a strictly mathematical point of view, but they are somewhat divorced 
from economic reality. Therefore, I do not consider these possibilities in this paper. 
 
2.3  Validity and criticism of the suspected causes 
2.3.1  Technology 
If technology greatly regresses, the GDP trend will clearly shift downwards because the steady 
state shifts “downward.” Here “technology” indicates the total factor productivity (TFP) in the 
aggregated production function of a country. If innovations are steadily generated and 
technology progresses constantly even after a great regression in technology (i.e., a period of 
reduced TFP), the inclination angle of the GDP trend will not change even though the intercept 
changes. 
 The most serious problem with this explanation is whether or not technology can 
actually regress (i.e., TFP can decrease) suddenly and greatly. A micro-foundation of 
technological regression is needed. Most endogenous growth models present a micro-foundation 
of technological progress in which existing innovations, knowledge, and human capital usually 
do not vanish easily or suddenly; that is, they are basically accumulated. To the best of my 
knowledge, no micro-foundation of technological regression in modern industrial economies 
has been presented. Machines and equipment for production will become obsolete as time 
passes, but new innovations are generated in every period and obsolete machines and equipment 
will be replaced with new advanced machines and equipment. Hence, the overall level of 
technology in an economy will not generally regress to a large extent; that is, TFP will not 
notably decrease from a scientific or technological point of view.  
 A decline in TFP may occur, however, if other elements associated with TFP 
malfunction. For example, a decline in the efficiency of institutions or systems (e.g., banks, 
legal systems, or transportation networks) may cause a decline in TFP. The efficiency of these 
institutions or systems is regarded to be an important element in determining the level of TFP 
(e.g., Levine, 1997; Levine et al., 2000; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Wachtel, 2003; Do and 
Levchenko, 2007). If some institutions or systems suddenly begin to malfunction to a large 
extent, TFP will eventually decrease. This change, however, will not occur immediately because 
the institutional elements in TFP do not affect current production capacity. A suddenly 
malfunctioning institution or system, therefore, will negatively affect TFP, but the negative 
effects will take time to be realized. For example, if the efficiency of banks degenerates, 
ongoing new business projects will be delayed and improper investments will be approved more 
often. As a result of the decreased efficiency in the banking system, TFP will gradually decline, 
and the negative effects will only be clearly observed in the long run. Many financial 
institutions in the United States were in crisis around 2008, but the level of physical production 
capacity (capital and labor) in most U.S. industries basically remained the same as before 2008. 
 In sum, it is very difficult to envision any micro-foundation for a sudden and large 
regression in technology, which makes it highly unlikely that technology was the cause of the 
downward shift in the GDP trend. 
 
2.3.2  The price mechanism 
If the price mechanism does not work well, many unusual phenomena will inevitably occur. For 
example, if there is friction in the process of price adjustments, the economy will not soon 
return to the steady state when the economy accidentally deviates from it; thus, the deviation 
will persist. Therefore, a shift in the GDP trend can be explained by assuming that some type of 
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friction exists in the price mechanism. After a large negative shock, a large economic downturn 
will persist if the price mechanism is not working properly. In addition, persistent large amounts 
of unused resources will also be observed. 
 It is not easy, however, to present a persuasive rationale for a malfunctioning price 
mechanism because the price mechanism is one of the most fundamental principles behind 
economic activities of rational agents. Rationality, in fact, guarantees a well-functioning price 
adjustment mechanism. Unless some type of irrationality is assumed, it is difficult to show a 
malfunctioning price mechanism. Many Keynesian economists, however, have tried to 
overcome this difficulty. Although some of these models can trace fluctuations in GDP, the 
micro-foundations they present do not seem to be sufficiently persuasive (e.g., Mankiw, 2001). 
Humans are generally considered to be clever and rational such that they cannot be persistently 
cheated; for example, they are assumed to exploit the opportunities provided by a friction, and 
the friction will thereby soon disappear. It is therefore difficult to envision friction as the cause 
of the GDP trend shift after the Great Recession. 
 More importantly, the persistence of the effect of friction is a serious problem. As 
shown in Figure 1, the GDP trend did not return to the pre-recession trend even 7 years after the 
shift. This fact indicates that the magnitude of the effect of friction has not diminished for 7 
years. Such a long period cannot be rationalized by any micro-foundation of friction in price 
adjustments. The Calvo staggered contracts model, which provides one of the most prominent 
micro-foundations of price friction, usually assumes that the effect of friction gradually 
diminishes as time passes and that most of the effect disappears a few years after the shock. In 
this case, 7 years seems to be a long-term phenomenon, or at least not a short-term one, and 
most researchers agree that models of friction cannot be applied to long-term phenomena. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that friction in price adjustments can explain the GDP trend shift after 
the Great Recession. 
 In addition, there is another important issue with this explanation. What shock 
triggered the sudden malfunction of the price mechanism? Frictions alone cannot generate a 
phenomenon such as the Great Recession. Initially, some type of huge negative shock must have 
occurred. The disruption that occurred in financial markets (e.g., the subprime mortgage crisis) 
around 2008 may have been such a shock. However, disruption in financial markets is not a 
deep parameter of a Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans economy in the optimization behavior of 
households. This type of shock may have temporarily affected households’ behavior, but its 
effects would have soon disappeared because households are basically indifferent to this type of 
shock when generating their expected future utilities, and the economy would soon return to the 
former steady state. Therefore, the shock that triggered the Great Recession remains uncertain 
with this explanation. 
 
2.3.3  A change in preferences 
If a fundamental preference (e.g., RTP), changes sufficiently, a large economic fluctuation will 
be generated because this change significantly affects the steady state. A changed steady state 
requires that many economic variables adjust to the new steady state. Consequently, a boom or a 
recession is generated. Therefore, a change in a fundamental preference can intrinsically be an 
important source of economic fluctuations. In addition, some preference shocks will generate 
persistent large amounts of unused resources (e.g., persistently high rates of unemployment), the 
generation mechanism of which is shown in Harashima (2004, 2013) and also in Appendix B.  
 An important criticism of this explanation is that preferences are assumed to remain 
constant. This conviction or preconception has been so widely shared by economists that 
preference shocks have rarely been studied as a source of economic fluctuations, even though 
preferences have never been proven to actually remain constant. Another problem is that, after 
RTP changes, consumption has to change in a direction that is not intuitively acceptable if 
Pareto optimality is to be held. For example, suppose that RTP shifts upwards. To keep Pareto 
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optimality, consumption must increase greatly at the time of the shift and then it needs to 
gradually decrease to the level appropriate for the new steady state and this level will be lower 
than it was before the shift. This upward jump of consumption does not seem to be intuitively 
acceptable because steady state consumption must eventually decrease. Compared with the first 
two explanations, however, the problems with this third explanation may be more surmountable. 
Although technological and monetary shocks have long been studied, preference shocks have 
rarely been studied as an important source of economic fluctuations. If the possibility of 
temporally variable RTP is examined in detail without preconceptions, it may be possible to 
easily solve the problems associated with this explanation. 
 Note that a change in risk preference (the degree of risk aversion) does not affect 
steady states in Ramsey-type dynamic models. Therefore, this preference is not considered in 
this paper. 
 
3  THE MOST LIKELY CAUSE OF THE GREAT 
RECESSION 
 
3.1  Solutions to the problems in explanation (3) 
3.1.1  Temporally changing expected preferences 
3.1.1.1  Necessity of expected preferences 
As noted previously, temporal variability of preferences has been indicated in many studies, but 
the question of the magnitude of its effects remains. Although an individual’s preferences may 
change a great deal, the average preferences of households may not change. However, 
Harashima (2014a, 2014b) showed that it is the expected preferences of the representative 
household, not the intrinsic preferences, that are important for households to behave optimally. 
The average intrinsic preferences of households may remain almost unchanged, but the 
expected preferences of the representative households may occasionally change by a large 
amount when conditions change because households change expectations if important new 
information is obtained. Expectations by nature, therefore, can change over time. 
 It is also important to note that the representative household should not be assumed to 
be the same as the average household if households are heterogeneous in preferences in a 
dynamic model. As Becker (1980) showed, if RTP is heterogeneous across households in a 
dynamic model, all capital will eventually be owned by the most patient household; thus, the 
average household is almost represented by the most patient household that monopolizes returns 
of capitals. Therefore, the representative household defined as the average household becomes 
meaningless in a dynamic model with households having heterogeneous RTPs. An alternatively 
defined representative household is needed when a dynamic model is used. In a dynamic 
macro-economic model, this newly defined representative household is indispensable, and all 
households must know the preferences of the representative household to achieve their 
optimality. Because they cannot know its intrinsic preferences, they must “expect” them. 
 
3.1.1.2  An alternative definition of the representative household’s preferences 
Harashima (2014a, 2014b) presented an alternative definition of the representative household 
that can be used in a dynamic model with households having heterogeneous preferences. The 
representative household is defined such that the behavior of the representative household is the 
collective behavior of all households under “sustainable heterogeneity.” Sustainable 
heterogeneity indicates the state at which all optimality conditions of all heterogeneous 
households are satisfied. 
 The concept of sustainable heterogeneity is explained in Appendix A and Harashima 
(2010) in detail. Suppose that there are  NH   groups of households in an economy. 
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Households in each group are identical, and all groups are identical except for RTP, the degree 
of risk aversion, or the productivity of each group’s households. A household includes a laborer 
who is one of the factors that determine the productivity of the group. The population growth 
rate is zero in all groups. The groups are fully open to each other, and goods, services, and 
capital are freely transacted among them, but labor is immobilized in each group. 
 Sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, that is, all optimality conditions of all 
heterogeneous households are satisfied, if and only if 
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for any i and j (i ≠ j) where ci,t, ki,t, and yi,t are per capita consumption, capital, and output of 
group i in period t, respectively; θi, εi, and ωi are RTP, the degree of risk aversion, and 
productivity of group i, respectively; At is technology in period t; and α, m, v, and are 
constants. In addition, tjiτ ,,  is the current account balance of group i with group j. The 
production function is a Harrod-neutral production function such that 
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 When sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, all heterogeneous households are 
connected (in the sense that all households behave by considering other households’ optimality) 
and appear to be behaving collectively as a combined supra-household that unites all households. 
The supra-household is unique and its behavior is time-consistent. Its actions always and 
consistently represent those of all households. Even if households are heterogeneous, they can 
be represented by a representative household as defined above. Unlike the representative 
household defined as the average household, the collective representative household reaches a 
steady state where all households satisfy all of their optimality conditions in dynamic models. 
 All households need to set their initial consumption to be consistent with sustainable 
heterogeneity for their optimality. Before setting their initial levels of consumption, households 
must calculate and expect the economic path under sustainable heterogeneity. To calculate and 
expect this path, each household first must know the RTP RH. However, although a household 
naturally knows its own RTP, it does not intrinsically know RTP RH. To know RTP RH, a 
household has to know the values of all the other households’ RTPs. Hence, the expected RTP 
RH must somehow be generated utilizing all other relevant available information. The necessity 
of an expected RTP RH is critically important because RTP plays a crucial role as the discount 
factor in dynamic models. 
 Note that, if we assume that RTP is identical for all households, an expected RTP RH 
is no longer needed because any household’s own RTP is equal to RTP RH. This solution is still 
problematic, however, because the assumption is not merely expedient for the sake of 
simplicity; rather, it is a critical requirement to eliminate the need for an expected RTP RH. 
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Therefore, any rationale for assuming identical RTPs needs to be validated; that is, it should be 
demonstrated that identical RTPs do exist and are universally observed. However, RTP is 
unquestionably not identical among households. Therefore, households must use an expected 
RTP RH. 
 Although households must generate an expected RTP RH to reach optimality, 
Harashima (2014a, 2014b) showed that the expected RTP RH cannot be generated based on a 
structural model of RTP RH, but rather it is created based on a belief. In addition, the belief can 
be influenced by heuristic considerations. The point is that it is very difficult to know the correct 
parameter values in any structural model of RTP RH. Beliefs based on heuristic considerations 
can be easily and largely revised over time as new information is acquired. This nature indicates 
that the expected RTP RH will change more frequently and to a greater extent than the intrinsic 
RTP RH. 
 A household’s expected RTP RH will of course change if the intrinsic RTP RH 
changes. Even if the intrinsic RTP RH does not change, however, a household’s expected RTP 
RH will change if its belief is changed. That is, the expected RTP RH can change independently 
of intrinsic changes in RTP RH. Therefore, even if intrinsic changes in RTP RH occur 
infrequently, changes in the expected RTP RH can occur frequently. Even a small piece of 
additional information about a relevant belief can significantly change the path of the economy. 
Hence, a large RTP shock can occur occasionally, which solves one of the two problems posed 
by explanation (3). 
 
3.1.2  Non-jump path of consumption 
3.1.2.1  The micro-foundation of a non-jump path 
The second important problem with the third explanation was the intuitively unacceptable jump 
path of consumption after a preference shock if households maintain a Pareto optimal path. 
However, Harashima (2004, 2013a) showed a mechanism whereby households rationally do not 
engage in this type of jump consumption after an RTP shock. Harashima (2004, 2013a) 
demonstrated that there is a Nash equilibrium that consists of strategies that generate Pareto 
inefficient payoffs (i.e., a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path) because households are 
intrinsically risk averse and not cooperative. In a strategic environment, this nature generates the 
possibility that, if consumption needs to be substantially and discontinuously increased to keep 
Pareto optimality, a non-cooperative household’s strategy to deviate from the Pareto optimal 
path gives a higher expected utility than the strategy of choosing the Pareto optimal path. If 
households are cooperative, they will always proceed on Pareto efficient paths because they will 
coordinate with each other to perfectly utilize all resources. Conversely, if they do not 
coordinate with each other, they may strategically not utilize all resources; that is, they may 
select a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path. In fact, households are intrinsically not 
cooperative—they act independently of one another. 
 Suppose that an upward shift of RTP occurs. All households will be knocked off the 
Pareto efficient path on which they were proceeding prior to the shift. At that moment, each 
household must decide how to proceed. Because they are no longer on a Pareto efficient path, 
households strategically choose a path on the basis of their expected utility calculated 
considering other households’ choices; that is, each household behaves non-cooperatively in its 
own interest considering other households’ strategies. Harashima (2004, 2013a) showed that, if 
a household is sufficiently risk averse, its expected utility is higher when its consumption does 
not jump than it is when it does. The mechanism of this outcome is also explained in detail in 
Appendix B. Nevertheless, this outcome depends on the expectation of other households’ 
behavior. All households generate the same expectation, but they behave non-cooperatively. 
This situation can be described by a non-cooperative mixed strategy game, and there is a Nash 
equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path as a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in this game. That is, 
the intuitively difficult response of consumption initially moving in the wrong direction will not 
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usually be generated. 
 Hence, the two problems noted for the third explanation (a preference shock) of the 
GDP trend shift can be resolved. Because it is much more difficult to solve the problems posed 
by the first two explanations (technology and the price system), a preference shock is the most 
likely cause of the Great Recession. 
 
3.1.2.2  Persistent and large amounts of unused resources 
An important feature of a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path is that the path is not 
Pareto efficient and therefore large amounts of unused resources are persistently generated, for 
example, large unemployment rates and a large amount of idle capital. The mechanism of this 
type of phenomena was first examined by Keynes for the period of the Great Depression. A 
similar (but less severe) phenomenon was observed during the Great Recession. A Nash 
equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path naturally explains persistent and large amounts of 
unused resources in an economy. 
 
3.2  Time preference or leisure preference shock? 
Although both main problems with the preference shock explanation can be resolved, the 
question remains: which preference changed—RTP, leisure preference (LP), or risk preference? 
As stated previously, risk preference is basically indifferent to economic fluctuations so it is not 
a factor. Changes in the expected RTP and LP, however, can both generate a Nash equilibrium 
of a Pareto inefficient path. Thus, both preferences can be a source of economic fluctuations.  
 A major difference between the expected RTP and LP is the likely range of change. A 
reasonable range of RTP will not be small, e.g., from about 2% to 8% annually (e.g., Frederick 
et al., 2002). Hence, there is room for the expected RTP to shift upward to a large extent (e.g., 
double from 3% to 6%). With LP, however, there is a consensus that a 10% increase in the 
wages leads to a 1% decrease in hours of work on average (e.g., Borjas, 2012). Hours of work 
are very inelastic and do not change to a large extent; that is, the average number of hours 
worked will not double or be halved in a given year. Therefore, there is little room for LP to 
substantially increase. In addition, even a small percentage point change in the expected RTP 
(e.g., from 3% to 5%) generates very large impacts because RTP is the discount factor in 
calculations of expected utility. A small change in the expected RTP can greatly change the 
expected utility and thereby also change the steady state. Considering this substantial difference 
between the expected RTP and LP, it is likely that a severe recession caused by a large shift in 
the steady state can only be generated by an upward shift of the expected RTP. A change in the 
expected LP may cause small-scale economic fluctuations, but it most likely will not be the 
ultimate source of a severe recession. 
 There is another difference between expected RTP and LP—the response to new 
information. It is likely that the Great Recession and the financial crisis that occurred around 
2008 were related. Financial crises may raise uncertainty about future economic conditions. In 
general, an increase in uncertainty will raise the expected RTP (see Harashima, 2004) and 
decrease the preference for leisure. An increase in RTP will generate a recession, but a decrease 
in the preference for leisure (i.e., an increase in the preference for work) will not. Therefore, if 
the Great Recession and the financial crisis that occurred around 2008 were related, an LP shock 
was not the cause of the Great Recession. 
A change in the expected RTP around 2008 triggered by information that had surfaced 
about many large financial institutions certainly could have caused many U.S. households to 
determine that their expected RTP RHs were wrong and needed to be corrected based on the 
newly obtained information. The upward RTP shock explanation is also consistent with the 
co-occurrence of severe recessions in other countries during this period. These coincidental 
recessions no doubt were at least partly generated through diminishing trade with the world’s 
largest economy (i.e., the United States) where the Great Recession initially broke out, but also 
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partly through upward changes in the expected RTP RH by households in these other countries 
upon obtaining information about the financial crisis and recession in the United States. 
 
4  ESTIMATES OF EXPECTED RTP RH 
 
4.1  Estimated expected U.S. RTP RH 
In this section, I examine whether the theoretical conclusions drawn in Section 3 are supported 
empirically. A problem in doing so is that time-series data of expected RTP RH cannot be 
directly obtained. Therefore, I estimated them indirectly based on the Euler equation such that  
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addition, nominal interest rates are one of the most important instruments in monetary policies, 
and are therefore usually significantly biased by interventions of central banks in financial 
markets. If agents regard monetary policies as a temporary manipulation, they will not respond 
naively to these policies; thus, the estimated real interest rates may provide biased information. 
As a result, it is likely that estimated rates of real interest do not necessarily correctly reflect 
t
t
k
y


.  
 For that reason, I directly estimated
t
t
k
y


using capital stock data and an assumed rate 
of average technological progress. The production function was assumed to be the same as 
equation (3) (i.e., a Harrod-neutral production function) such that α
t
α
tt kAy
 1 ; thus,  
 
   αt
α
t
t
t kαA
k
y 


1 .                           (5) 
 
I estimated the time-series data of 
t
t
k
y


based on equation (5), with the kt data and the assumed 
values of At and α. Using these estimated values of 
t
t
k
y


 and the published ct data, I then 
estimated the time-series data of expected RTP RH (θt) based on equation (4). 
 
 Data for ct were derived from National Economic Accounts distributed by the U.S. 
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Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and kt data were derived from the 
chain-type quantity index for private nonresidential fixed assets in National Economic Accounts. 
α as the labor share was set at 0.7 that is a typical value of labor share, and α
tA was assumed to 
grow constantly at 1.25% annually, meaning that technology was assumed to basically progress 
constantly. This rate of growth (1.25%) was adopted based on an average per capita GDP 
growth rate of 1.8% annually because, if sustainable heterogeneity is satisfied, equation (2) 
holds; that is, the growth rate of At is equal to the growth rate of yt on a balanced growth path. 
Therefore, by equation (3), the growth rate of α
tA is   25.11001018.1 7.0  % annually. 
Because my primary focus is fluctuations of the expected RTP RH and not the absolute level of 
At, At was set to make the level of the expected RTP RH equal 0.03 in 1985. The expected RTP 
RH of the United States in 1985 may not have been 0.03, but the actual level itself is not the 
important point—the range of the temporal changes in the values are. Setting the level in this 
manner further illustrates how difficult, if not impossible, it is to know the actual RTP RH.  
 The estimation results are shown in Figure 2. The expected RTP RH was relatively 
high in the periods of the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and around 2008—all periods of 
recession. The expected RTP RH before 2008 was clearly lower than that after 2008 and lower 
in general than at other times, except for the recession periods of the early 1980s and the early 
1990s. In the latter part of the 1990s and the first half of 2000s, the era of the so-called “New 
Economy,” the expected RTP RH continued to be relatively low, but it rose suddenly when the 
Great Recession began. The difference of the average expected RTP RH between the period of 
post-2008 and the period of 1992–2007 (i.e., from the end of the early 1990s recession to the 
beginning of the Great Recession) is 1–2 percentage points. This result is consistent with 
explanation (3); that is, an upward 1–2 percentage point RTP shock was the cause of the Great 
Recession.  
 
Figure 2: The estimated RTP RH of the United States 
(%) 
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4.2  Japan’s estimated expected RTP RH 
Japan experienced a long-lasting period of economic stagnation in the 1990s. To examine 
whether this stagnation was also generated by an upward RTP shock, I estimated the time-series 
of the expected RTP RH of Japan by using the same method as I did for the United States. kt 
data were derived from the non-financial produced tangible fixed assets in the National 
Accounts of Japan, and ct data were also derived from the National Accounts of Japan. α was 
assumed to be 0.7 and α
tA is assumed to grow constantly at 1.25% annually for the same reasons 
as described in the U.S. case. Because my primary focus is fluctuations of the expected RTP RH 
and not the absolute level of At, the initial level of At was also set to make the level of the 
expected RTP RH be 0.03 in 1985. 
 The estimation results are shown in Figure 3. The average expected RTP RH before 
1991 was lower than that after 1991 by about 2–3 percentage points. In the second half of 1980s, 
the era of the so-called “bubble economy” in Japan, the expected RTP RH was particularly low, 
but it rose sharply in 1991 when the “bubble” burst. The estimated expected RTP RH of Japan is 
consistent with the explanation that an upward RTP shock generated the stagnation of the 
Japanese economy in the 1990s. The estimated upward shift was larger than that of the U.S. 
case during the Great Recession by about 1 percentage point, which implies that the negative 
impact of the upward RTP shock in the 1990s in Japan was far greater than that of the Great 
Recession in 2008 in the United States 
 
Figure 3: The estimated RTP RH of Japan 
(%) 
 
 
5  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The GDP trend of the United States shifted notably downward after the Great Recession but has 
not yet returned to the pre-recession trend. This shift indicates that the cause of the Great 
Recession was a change in a fundamental factor that has the potential to shift the steady state. In 
this paper, I examined three possible causes for the shift: a change in technology, a change in 
 12 
preferences, and a sudden malfunctioning of the price mechanism. A change in preferences has 
generally been unexplored as a source of large economic fluctuations because of the prevailing 
preconception that preferences must be temporally stable. However, this temporal stability has 
not been proven, and there have been theoretical and empirical studies that indicate that 
preferences, particularly RTP, in fact are temporally variable. 
 I showed that, unlike the technology shock and price mechanism explanations, there 
are no theoretical problems with an upward RTP shock as the cause of the Great Recession. 
This is true because it is the expected RTP RH, not the intrinsic RTP RH, that is of importance 
in economic activities. In addition, households behave intrinsically non-cooperatively, which 
generates a Nash equilibrium that consists of strategies that generate Pareto inefficient payoffs. I 
therefore concluded that an upward expected RTP RH shock is the most likely cause of the 
Great Recession. To validate this conclusion, I estimated the yearly expected RTP RH of the 
United States and found that the expected RTP RH shifted upwards by 1–2 percentage points 
when the Great Recession began. This empirical result supports the explanation that the Great 
Recession was caused by an upward RTP shock. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
A1  The representative household 
A1.1  The representative household in dynamic models 
A1.1.1  The assumption of the representative household 
The concept of the representative household is a necessity in macroeconomic studies. It is used 
as a matter of course, but its theoretical foundation is fragile. The representative household has 
been used given the assumption that all households are identical or that there exists one specific 
individual household, the actions of which are always average among households (I call such a 
household “the average household” in this paper). The assumption that all households are 
identical seems to be too strict; therefore, it is usually assumed explicitly or implicitly that the 
representative household is the average household. However, the average household can exist 
only under very strict conditions. Antonelli (1886) showed that the existence of an average 
household requires that all households have homothetic and homogeneous utility functions. This 
type of utility function is not usually assumed in macroeconomic studies because it is very 
restrictive and unrealistic. If more general utility functions are assumed, however, the 
assumption of the representative household as the average household is inconsistent with the 
assumptions underlying the utility functions.  
 Nevertheless, the assumption of the representative household has been widely used, 
probably because it has been believed that the representative household can be interpreted as an 
approximation of the average household. Particularly in static models, the representative 
household can be seen to approximate the average household. However, in dynamic models, it 
is hard to accept the representative household as an approximation of the average household 
because, if RTPs of households are heterogeneous, there is no steady state where all of the 
optimality conditions of the heterogeneous households are satisfied (Becker, 1980). Therefore, 
macroeconomic studies using dynamic models are fallacious if the representative household is 
assumed to approximate the average household.  
 
A1.1.2  The representative household in static models 
Static models are usually used to analyze comparative statics. If the average household is 
represented by one specific unique household for any static state, there will be no problem in 
assuming the representative household as an approximation of the average household. Even 
though the average household is not always represented by one specific unique household in 
some states, if the average household is always represented by a household in a set of 
households that are very similar in preferences and other features, then the representative 
household assumption can be used to approximate the average household.  
 Suppose, for simplicity, that households are heterogeneous such that they are identical 
except for a particular preference. Because of the heterogeneous preference, household 
consumption varies. However, levels of consumption will not be distributed randomly because 
the distribution of consumption will correspond to the distribution of the preference. The 
consumption of a household that has a very different preference from the average will be very 
different from the average household consumption. Conversely, it is likely that the consumption 
of a household that has the average preference will nearly have the average consumption. In 
addition, the order of the degree of consumption will be almost unchanged for any static state 
because the order of the degree of the preference does not change for the given state.   
 If the order of consumption is unchanged for any given static state, it is likely that the 
household with consumption that is closest to the average consumption will also always be a 
household belonging to a group of households that have very similar preferences. Hence, it is 
possible to argue that, approximately, one specific unique household’s consumption is always 
average for any static state. Of course, it is possible to show evidence that is counter to this 
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argument, particularly in some special situations, but it is likely that this conjecture is usually 
true in normal situations, and the assumption that the representative household approximates the 
average household is acceptable in static models. 
 
A1.1.3  The representative household in dynamic models 
In dynamic models, however, the story is more complicated. In particular, heterogeneous RTPs 
pose a serious problem. This problem is easily understood in a dynamic model with exogenous 
technology (i.e., a Ramsey growth model). Suppose that households are heterogeneous in RTP, 
degree of risk aversion (ε), and productivity of the labor they provide. Suppose also for 
simplicity that there are many “economies” in a country, and an economy consists of a 
household and a firm. The household provides labor to the firm in the particular economy, and 
the firm’s level of technology (A) varies depending on the productivity of labor that the 
household in its economy provides. Economies trade with each other: that is, the entire economy 
of a country consists of many individual small economies that trade with each other.  
 A household maximizes its expected utility,    dtθtcuE t 

exp
0
, subject to 
 
 
  ttt ckfk  , where  u  is the utility function;  f  is the production function; θ is 
RTP; E is the expectation operator; 
t
t
t
L
Y
y  , 
t
t
t
L
K
k  , and 
t
t
t
L
C
c  ; Yt (≥ 0) is output, Kt (≥ 0) 
is capital input, Lt (≥ 0) is labor input, and Ct (≥ 0) is consumption in period t. The optimal 
consumption path of this Ramsey-type growth model is   
 
 









  θ
k
y
ε
c
c
t
t
t
t 1

 , 
 
and at steady state, 
 
θ
k
y
t
t 


 .                              (A1) 
 
Therefore, at steady state, the heterogeneity in the degree of risk aversion (ε) is irrelevant, and 
the heterogeneity in productivity does not result in permanent trade imbalances among 
economies because 
t
t
k
y


in all economies is kept equal by market arbitrage. Hence, 
heterogeneity in the degree of risk aversion and productivity does not matter at steady state. 
Therefore, the same logic as that used for static models can be applied. Approximately, one 
specific unique household’s consumption is always average for any time in dynamic models, 
even if the degree of risk aversion and the productivity are heterogeneous. Thus, the assumption 
of the representative household is also acceptable in dynamic models even if the degree of risk 
aversion and the productivity are heterogeneous. 
 However, equation (A1) clearly indicates that heterogeneity in RTP is problematic. As 
Becker (1980) shows, if RTP is heterogeneous, the household that has the lowest RTP will 
eventually possess all capital. With heterogeneous RTPs, there is no steady state where all 
households achieve all of their optimality conditions. In addition, the household with 
consumption that is average at present has a very different RTP from the household with 
consumption that is average in the distant future. The consumption of a household that has the 
average RTP will initially be almost average, but in the future the household with the lowest 
RTP will be the one with consumption that is almost average. That is, the consumption path of 
the household that presently has average consumption is notably different from that of the 
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household with average consumption in the future. Therefore, any individual household cannot 
be almost average in any period and thus cannot even approximate the average household. As a 
result, even if the representative household is assumed in a dynamic model, its discounted 
expected utility    dtθtcuE t 

exp
0
 is meaningless, and analyses based on it are 
fallacious.  
  If we assume that RTP is identical for all households, the above problem is solved. 
However, this solution is still problematic because that assumption is not merely expedient for 
the sake of simplicity; rather, it is a critical requirement to allow for an assumed representative 
household. Therefore, the rationale for identical RTPs should be validated; that is, it should be 
demonstrated that identical RTPs are actually and universally observed. RTP is, however, 
unquestionably not identical among households. Hence, it is difficult to accept the 
representative household assumption in dynamic models based on the assumption of identical 
RTP. 
 The conclusion that the representative household assumption in dynamic models is 
meaningless and leads to fallacious results is very important, because a huge number of studies 
have used the representative household assumption in dynamic models. To solve this severe 
problem, an alternative interpretation or definition of the representative household is needed. 
 Note that in an endogenous growth model the situation is even more complicated. 
Because a heterogeneous degree of risk aversion also matters, the assumption of the 
representative household is more difficult to accept, so an alternative interpretation or definition 
is even more important when endogenous growth models are used. 
 
A1.2  Sustainable heterogeneity 
A1.2.1  The model 
Suppose that two heterogeneous economies―economy 1 and economy 2—are identical except 
for their RTPs. Households within each economy are assumed to be identical for simplicity. The 
population growth rate is zero. The economies are fully open to each other, and goods, services, 
and capital are freely transacted between them, but labor is immobilized in each economy. 
 Each economy can be interpreted as representing either a country (the international 
interpretation) or a group of identical households in a country (the national interpretation). 
Because the economies are fully open, they are integrated through trade and form a combined 
economy. The combined economy is the world economy in the international interpretation and 
the national economy in the national interpretation. In the following discussion, a model based 
on the international interpretation is called an international model and that based on the national 
interpretation is called a national model. Usually, the concept of the balance of payments is used 
only for the international transactions. However, because both national and international 
interpretations are possible, this concept and terminology are also used for the national models 
in this paper. 
 RTP of household in economy 1 is 
1θ  and that in economy 2 is θ2, and θ1 < θ2. The 
production function in economy 1 is  ,t
α
,t kfAy 11   and that in economy 2 is 
 ,t
α
,t kfAy 22  , where yi,t and ki,t are, respectively, output and capital per capita in economy i 
in period t for i = 1, 2; A is technology; and α  10  α  is a constant. The population of each 
economy is 
2
L
; thus, the total for both is L, which is sufficiently large. Firms operate in both 
economies. The current account balance in economy 1 is τt and that in economy 2 is –τt. The 
production functions are specified as  
 
 α
ti,
α
i,t kAy
 1  ; 
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thus,    2,11,, 
 iALKY
αα
titi
. Because A is given exogenously, this model is an exogenous 
technology model (Ramsey growth model). The examination of sustainable heterogeneity based 
on an endogenous growth model is shown in Harashima (2014a).  
 Because both economies are fully open, returns on investments in each economy are 
kept equal through arbitration, such that  
 
,t
,t
,t
,t
k
y
k
y
2
2
1
1





 .                            (A2) 
 
Because equation (A2) always holds through arbitration, equations 
tt kk ,2,1  , tt kk ,2,1
  , 
tt yy ,2,1  , and tt yy ,2,1    also hold.  
 The accumulated current account balance dsτ
t
s0  mirrors capital flows between the 
two economies. The economy with current account surpluses invests them in the other economy. 
Because 













t
t
t
t
k
y
k
y
,2
,2
,1
,1  are returns on investments, dsτ
k
y t
s
t
t


0
,1
,1  and dsτ
k
y t
s
t
t


0
,2
,2  
represent income receipts or payments on the assets that an economy owns in the other economy. 
Hence,  
 
dsτ
k
y
τ
t
s
t
t
t 


0
,2
,2  
 
is the balance on goods and services of economy 1, and  
 
t
t
s
t
t
τdsτ
k
y



0
,1
,1  
 
is that of economy 2. Because the current account balance mirrors capital flows between the 
economies, the balance is a function of capital in both economies, such that  
 
  ,t,tt ,kkκτ 21  . 
 
 The government (or an international supranational organization) intervenes in the 
activities of economies 1 and 2 by transferring money from economy 1 to economy 2. The 
amount of transfer in period t is gt, and it is assumed that gt depends on capital inputs, such that  
 
,tt kgg 1 ,
 
 
where g  is a constant. Because tt kk ,2,1   and tt kk ,2,1
  , 
 
 
,t,tt kgkgg 21   . 
 
 Each household in economy 1 therefore maximizes its expected utility 
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    dttθcuE t 1
0
,11 exp 

 , 
 
subject to 
  ,tt
t
s
α
,t
α
,t
α
,t
α
t kgτdsτkAαckAk 1
0
11
1
1,1 1  
  ,            (A3) 
 
and each household in economy 2 maximizes its expected utility 
 
    dttθcuE t 2
0
,22 exp 

 , 
 
subject to 
  tt
t
s
α
t
α
,t
α
t
α
t kgτdsτkAαckAk ,2
0
,22
1
,2,2 1  
  ,            (A4) 
 
where ui,t and ci,t, respectively, are the utility function and per capita consumption in economy i 
in period t for i = 1, 2; and E is the expectation operator. Equations (A3) and (A4) implicitly 
assume that each economy does not have foreign assets or debt in period t = 0. 
 
A1.2.2  Sustainable heterogeneity without government intervention 
Heterogeneity is defined as being sustainable if all of the optimality conditions of all 
heterogeneous households are satisfied indefinitely. First, the natures of the model when the 
government does not intervene (i.e., 0g ) are examined. The growth rate of consumption in 
economy 1 is 
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Hence,  
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and thereby  
 
      0111lim 11 


θΞΨαkAα α,t
α
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t
t
t
t
t
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τ
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τ
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0limlim
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,t
t τ
τ
k
k 
, and Ψ is constant at steady state because k1,t and τt are constant; thus, 
t
t
t k
τ
Ξ
,1
lim

  is constant at steady state. For Ψ to be constant at steady state, it is necessary that 
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0lim 

t
t
τ  and thus 0Ξ . Therefore,  
 
      0111lim 11 
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t
 ,                  (A5) 
 
and 
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By equations (A5) and (A7),  
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If equation (A8) holds, all of the optimality conditions of both economies are indefinitely 
satisfied. The state indicated by equation (A8) is called the “multilateral steady state” or 
“multilateral state” in the following discussion. By procedures similar to those used for the 
endogenous growth model in Harashima (2014a), the condition of the multilateral steady state 
for H economies that are identical except for their RTPs is shown as  
 
H
θ
k
y
H
q
q
i.t
i,t
t





 1
lim                            (A9) 
 
for any i, where i = 1, 2, … , H.  
 Because  
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by equation (A8), then by 0lim
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that is, economy 1 possesses accumulated debts owed to economy 2 at steady state, and 
economy 1 has to export goods and services to economy 2 by 
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in every period to pay the debts. Nevertheless, because 0lim 

t
t
τ  and 0Ξ , the debts do 
not explode but stabilize at steady state. Because of the debts, the consumption of economy 1 is 
smaller than that of economy 2 at steady state under the condition of sustainable heterogeneity.  
 Note that many empirical studies conclude that RTP is negatively correlated with 
income (e.g., Lawrance, 1991; Samwick, 1998; Ventura, 2003). Suppose that, in addition to the 
heterogeneity in RTP (θ1 < θ2), the productivity of economy 1 is higher than that of economy 2. 
At steady state, the consumption of economy 1 would be larger than that of economy 2 as a 
result of the heterogeneity in productivity. However, as a result of the heterogeneity in RTP, the 
consumption of economy 1 is smaller than that of economy 2 at steady state under sustainable 
heterogeneity. Which effect prevails will depend on differences in the degrees of heterogeneity. 
For example, if the difference in productivity is relatively large whereas that in RTP is relatively 
small, the effect of the productivity difference will prevail and the consumption of economy 1 
will be larger than that of economy 2 at steady state under sustainable heterogeneity.  
 
A1.2.3  Sustainable heterogeneity with government intervention 
Sustainable heterogeneity is a very different state from the one Becker (1980) described. The 
difference emerges because, in a multilateral state, economy 1 behaves by fully considering 
economy 2’s conditions. The multilateral state therefore will not be naturally selected by 
economy 1, and the path selection may have to be decided politically (see Harashima, 2010). On 
the other hand, when economy 1 behaves unilaterally, the government may intervene in 
economic activities so as to achieve, for example, social justice. 
 In this section, I show that, even if economy 1 behaves unilaterally, sustainable 
heterogeneity can always be achieved with appropriate government intervention.   
 
A1.2.3.1  The two-economy model 
Government intervention is first considered in the two-economy model constructed in Section 
A1.2.1. If the government intervenes (i.e., 0g ),  
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Because 0g , equations (A5) and (A6) are changed to   
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and 
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If economy 1 behaves unilaterally such that equation (A10) is satisfied, then  
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At the same time, if economy 2 behaves unilaterally such that equation (A11) is satisfied, then  
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By equations (A10) and (A11) 
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This equation is identical to equation (A8) and is satisfied at the multilateral steady state. 
Therefore,  
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If g  is set equal to equation (A12), all optimality conditions of both economies 1 and 2 are 
satisfied even though economy 1 behaves unilaterally.   
 There are various values of Ψ, depending on the initial consumption economy 1 sets. If 
economy 1 behaves in such a way as to make 0lim
0
 dsτ
t
s
t
, and particularly, make g = 0 
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such that 
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by equation (A12). Equation (A13) is identical to equation (A7); that is, the state where 
equation (A13) is satisfied is identical to the multilateral state with no government intervention 
(i.e., g = 0). On the other hand, if economy 1 behaves in such a way as to make 
0lim
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This condition is identical to that for sustainable heterogeneity with government intervention in 
the endogenous growth model shown by Harashima (2012). Furthermore, if economy 1 behaves 
in such a way as to make 0lim
0
 dsτ
t
s
t
, g is positive and is given by equation (A12). 
 There are various steady states, depending on the values of 
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t
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dsτ
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  and the 
initial consumption set by economy 1. Nevertheless, at any steady state that satisfies equation 
(A13), all of the optimality conditions of economy 1 are satisfied (by government intervention, 
all optimality conditions of economy 2 are also satisfied). For economy 1, all steady states are 
equally optimal. Economy 1 selects one of the steady states (i.e., sets the initial consumption); 
for example, it may select the one that gives the highest expected utility, the highest steady state 
consumption, or some values based on other criteria. Note, however, that an overly large 
positive Ψ requires zero initial consumption and thus a certain upper bound of Ψ will exist.  
 
A1.2.3.2  The multi-economy model 
In this section, for simplicity, only the case of 0lim
1
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Ψ  is considered. It is 
assumed that there are H economies that are identical except for their RTPs. If H = 2, when 
sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, economies 1 and 2 consist of a combined economy 
(economy 1+2) with twice the population and a RTP of 
2
21 θθ  . Suppose there is a third 
economy with a RTP of θ3. Because economy 1+2 has twice the population of economy 3, if 
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then  
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By iterating similar procedures, if government transfer between economy H and economy 1+2+ 
∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) is such that  
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for any i (= 1, 2, ∙ ∙ ∙, H).  
 
A1.3  An alternative definition of the representative household 
A1.3.1  The definition 
Section A1.2 indicates that, when sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, all heterogeneous 
households are connected (in the sense that all households behave by considering other 
households’ optimality) and appear to be behaving collectively as a combined supra-household 
that unites all households, as equations (A8) and (A9) indicate. The supra-household is unique 
and its behavior is time-consistent. Its actions always and consistently represent those of all 
households. Considering these natures of households under sustainable heterogeneity, I present 
the following alternative definition of the representative household: “the behavior of the 
representative household is defined as the collective behavior of all households under 
sustainable heterogeneity.” 
 Even if households are heterogeneous, they can be represented by a representative 
household as defined above. Unlike the representative household defined as the average 
household, the collective representative household reaches a steady state where all households 
satisfy all of their optimality conditions in dynamic models. In addition, this representative 
household has a RTP that is equal to the average RTP as shown in equations (A8) and (A9).1 
Hence, we can assume not only a representative household but also that its RTP is the average 
rate of all households.  
 
A1.3.2  Universality of sustainable heterogeneity 
An important point, however, is that this alternatively defined representative household can be 
used in dynamic models only if sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, but this condition is not 
necessarily always naturally satisfied. Sustainable heterogeneity is achieved only if households 
with lower RTPs behave multilaterally or the government appropriately intervenes. Therefore, 
the representative household assumption is not necessarily naturally acceptable in dynamic 
                                                          
1 If sustainable heterogeneity is achieved with the help of the government’s intervention, the time preference rate 
of the representative household will not be exactly equal to the average rate of time preference. 
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models unless it is confirmed that sustainable heterogeneity is usually achieved in an economy.  
 Notwithstanding this flaw, the representative household assumption has been widely 
used in many macroeconomic studies that use dynamic models. Furthermore, these studies have 
been little criticized for using the inappropriate representative household assumption. In 
addition, in most economies, the dire state that Becker (1980) predicts has not been observed 
even though RTPs of households are unquestionably heterogeneous. These facts conversely 
indicate that sustainable heterogeneity―probably with government interventions―has been 
usually and universally achieved across economies and time periods. In a sense, these facts are 
indirect evidence that sustainable heterogeneity usually prevails in economies.  
 Note that because the representative household’s behavior in dynamic models is 
represented by the collective behavior of all households under sustainable heterogeneity, RH’s 
RTP is not intrinsically known to households, but they do need to have an expected rate. Each 
household intrinsically knows its own preferences, but it does not intrinsically know the 
collective preference of all households. Therefore, in dynamic models, it must be assumed that 
all households do not ex ante know RH’s RTP, but households estimate it from information on 
the behaviors of other households and the government.  
 
A2  Need for an expected RTP RH 
A2.1  The behavior of household 
Achieving sustainable heterogeneity affects the behavior of the individual household because 
sustainable heterogeneity indicates that each household must consider the other households’ 
optimality (as well as the behavior of the government, if necessary). This feature does not mean 
that households behave cooperatively with other households. Each household behaves 
non-cooperatively based on its own RTP, but at the same time, it behaves considering whether 
the other households’ optimality conditions are achieved or not. This consideration affects the 
actions a household takes in that it affects the choice of a household’s initial consumption. 
 Sustainable heterogeneity indicates that a household’s future path of consumption has 
to be consistent with the future path of sustainable heterogeneity. Thereby, a household sets its 
initial consumption such that it will proceed on the path that is consistent with the path of 
sustainable heterogeneity and eventually reach a steady state. 
 
A2.2  Deviation from sustainable heterogeneity 
A2.2.1  Political elements 
What happens if a household deviates from sustainable heterogeneity? A deviation means that a 
household sets its initial consumption at a level that is not consistent with sustainable 
heterogeneity. For less advantaged households (i.e., households with higher RTPs), the only way 
to satisfy all of their optimality conditions is to set their initial consumption consistent with 
sustainable heterogeneity. Therefore, they will not take the initiative to deviate. In contrast, the 
most advantaged households (i.e., those with the lowest RTP) can satisfy all of their optimality 
conditions even if they set initial consumption independent of sustainable heterogeneity. The 
incentive for the most advantaged household to select a multilateral path will be weak because 
the growth rate of the most advantaged household on the multilateral path is lower than that on 
the unilateral path. 
 When economy 1 selects the unilateral path, does economy 2 quietly accept the 
unfavorable consequences shown in Becker (1980)? From an economic perspective, the optimal 
response of economy 2 is the one shown in Harashima (2010): economy 2 should behave as a 
follower and accept the unfavorable consequences. However, if other factors—particularly 
political ones—are taken into account, the response of economy 2 will be different. Faced with 
a situation in which all the optimality conditions cannot be satisfied, it is highly likely that 
economy 2 would politically protest and resist economy 1. It should be emphasized economy 2 
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is not responsible for its own non-optimality, which is a result of economy 1’s unilateral 
behavior in a heterogeneous population. Economy 2 may overlook the non-optimality if it is 
temporary, but it will not if it is permanent. As shown in Harashima (2010), the non-optimality 
is permanent, it is quite likely that economy 2 will seriously resist economy 1 politically.  
 If economy 1 could achieve its optimality only on the unilateral path, economy 1 
would counter the resistance of economy 2, but this is not the case. Because of this, economy 
2’s demand does not necessarily appear to be unreasonable or selfish. Faced with the protest and 
resistance by economy 2, economy 1 may compromise or cooperate with economy 2 and select 
the multilateral path. 
 
A2.2.2  Resistance 
The main objective of economy 2 is to force economy 1 to select the multilateral path and to 
establish sustainable heterogeneity. This objective may be achieved through cooperative 
measures, non-violent civil disobedience (e.g., trade restrictions), or other more violent means. 
Restricting or abolishing trade between the two economies will cost economy 1 
because it necessitates a restructuring of the division of labor, and the restructuring will not be 
confined to a small scale. Large-scale adjustments will develop that involve all levels of divided 
labor, because they are all correlated with each other. For example, if an important industry had 
previously existed only in one economy, owing to a division of labor, and trade between the two 
economies was no longer permitted, the other economy would have to establish this industry 
while also maintaining other industries. As a result, economy 1 would incur non-negligible costs. 
More developed economies have more complicated and sophisticated divisions of labor, and 
restructuring costs from the disruption of trade will be much higher in developed economies. In 
addition, more resources will need to be allocated to the generation of technology because 
technology will also no longer be traded. Finally, all of the conventional benefits of trade will be 
lost. Trade is beneficial because of the heterogeneous endowment of resources, as the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem shows. Because goods and services are assumed to be uniform in the 
models presented in this paper, the benefits of trade are implicit in the models. However, in the 
real word, resources such as oil and other raw materials are unevenly distributed, so a disruption 
or restriction of trade will substantially damage economic activities on both national and 
international levels. 
 The damage done by trade restrictions has an upper limit, however, because the 
restructuring of the division of labor, additional resource allocation to innovation, and loss of 
trade benefits are all finite. Therefore, in some cases, particularly if economies are not 
sufficiently developed and division of labor is not complex, the damage caused will be 
relatively small. Hence, a disruption of trade (non-violent civil disobedience in the national 
models) may not be sufficiently effective as a means of resistance under some these conditions. 
In some cases, harassment, sabotage, intimidation, and violence may be used, whether 
legal or illegal. In extreme cases, war or revolution could ensue. In such cases, economy 1 will 
be substantially damaged in many ways and be unable to achieve optimality. The resistance and 
resulting damages will continue until sustainability is established. 
 In any case, the objective of economy 2’s resistance conversely implies that 
establishing sustainability eliminates the risk and cost of political and social instability. The 
resistance of economy 2 will lower the desire of economy 1 to select the unilateral path. 
 
A2.2.3  United economies 
An important countermeasure to the fragility of sustainable heterogeneity for less advantaged 
economies is the formation of a union of economies. If economies other than economy 1 are 
united by commonly selecting the multilateral path within them, their power to resist economy 1 
will be substantially enhanced. Consider the multi-economy model shown in Harashima (2010). 
If the economies do not form a union, the power to resist the unilateral actions of economy 1 is 
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divided and limited to the power of each individual economy. However, if the economies are 
united, the power to resist economy 1 increases. If a sufficient number of economies unite, the 
multilateral path will almost certainly be selected by economy 1. 
 To maintain the union, any economy in the union should have the explicit and 
resolved intention of selecting the multilateral path within the union, even if it is relatively more 
advantaged within the union. To demand that relatively more advantaged economies select the 
multilateral path, less advantaged economies themselves must also select the multilateral path in 
any case. Otherwise, less advantaged economies will be divided and ruled by more advantaged 
economies. For all heterogeneous people to happily coexist, all of them should behave 
multilaterally. At the same time, Harashima (2010) indicates that the more advantaged an 
economy is, the more modestly it should behave, i.e., the more it should restrain itself from 
accumulating extra capitals. 
 In general, therefore, the most advantaged (the lowest RTP) household will be forced 
to set its initial consumption consistent with sustainable heterogeneity. 
 
A2.3  Need for an expected RTP RH 
Because all households need to set their initial consumption consistent with sustainable 
heterogeneity to achieve it, households must calculate the path of sustainable heterogeneity 
before setting their initial consumption levels. To calculate this level, each household first must 
know the value of RTP RH. However, although a household naturally knows the value of its 
own RTP, it does not intrinsically know the value of RTP RH. To know this, a household would 
have to know the values of all of the other households’ RTPs. Hence, the expected value of RTP 
RH must somehow be generated utilizing all other relevant available information. The necessity 
of an expected RTP RH is critically important because RTP plays a crucial role as the discount 
factor in dynamic models. 
 Note that, if we assume that RTP is identical for all households, an expected RTP RH 
is no longer needed because any household’s own RTP is equal to the RTP RH. This solution is 
still problematic, however, because the assumption is not merely expedient for the sake of 
simplicity; rather, it is a critical requirement to eliminate the need for an expected RTP RH. 
Therefore, any rationale for assuming identical RTPs should be validated; that is, it should be 
demonstrated that identical RTPs do exist and are universally observed. However, RTP is 
unquestionably not identical among households. Therefore, households must use expected 
values of RTP RH. 
 
A3  The RTP model 
A3.1  Need to know the structural model  
If RTP RH is a constant parameter, as has been long and widely assumed, the need for an 
expected RTP RH would not be a serious problem. The historical mean of an unchanging RTP 
RH could be estimated relatively precisely based on long-term data of various economic 
indicators even if the structural model remained unknown. The RTP RH could be specified as 
the RTP that is most consistent with long-term trends of the indicators. 
 Although RTP has been treated as a constant parameter in many studies, this feature 
has not been demonstrated either empirically or theoretically. Rather, the assumption is merely 
expedient for the sake of simplicity. There is another practical reason for this treatment: models 
with a permanently constant RTP exhibit excellent tractability (see Samuelson, 1937). However, 
some have argued that it is natural to view RTP as temporally variable, and the concept of a 
temporally varying RTP has a long history (e.g., Böhm-Bawerk, 1889; Fisher, 1930). More 
recently, Lawrance (1991) and Becker and Mulligan (1997) showed that people do not inherit 
permanently constant RTPs by nature and that economic and social factors affect the formation 
of RTPs. Their arguments indicate that many incidents can affect and change RTP. Models of 
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endogenous RTP have been presented, the most familiar of which is Uzawa’s (1968) model. 
 If the RTP RH is temporally variable, its future stream must be expected by 
households, and a rational expectation is a model-consistent expectation. To generate rational 
expectations of RTP RH, therefore, the structural model of the RTP RH (i.e., equations that 
fundamentally describe how it is endogenously formed) needs to be known. 
 
A3.2  Endogenous RTP models 
A3.2.1 Uzawa’s (1968) model 
The most well-known endogenous RTP model is that of Uzawa (1968). It has been applied in 
many analyses (e.g., Epstein and Hynes, 1983; Lucas and Stokey, 1984; Epstein, 1987; Obstfeld, 
1990). However, Uzawa’s model has not necessarily been regarded as a realistic expression of 
the endogeneity of RTP because it has a serious drawback in that impatience increases as 
income, consumption, and utility increase. The basic structure of Uzawa’s model is 
 
  tt cuθθ
 , 
 t
t
cdu
dθ
0 , 
 
in which RTP in period t (θt) is temporally variable and an increasing function of present utility 
u(ct) where ct is consumption in period t. The condition 
 t
t
cdu
dθ
0  is necessary for the model 
to be stable. This property is quite controversial and difficult to accept a priori because many 
empirical studies have indicated that RTP is negatively correlated with permanent income (e.g., 
Lawrance, 1991); thus, many economists are critical of Uzawa’s model. Epstein (1987), 
however, discussed the plausibility of increasing impatience and offered some 
counter-arguments. However, his view is in the minority, and most economists support 
arguments in favor of a decreasing RTP, such that 
 
0
t
t
cdu
dθ
. Hence, although Uzawa’s model 
attracted some attention, the analysis of the endogeneity of RTP has progressed very little. 
Although Uzawa’s model may be flawed, it does not mean that the conjecture that RTP is 
influenced by future income, consumption, and utility is fallacious. Rather, it means that an 
appropriate model in which RTP is negatively correlated with income, consumption, and utility 
has not been presented. 
 
A3.2.2 Size effect on impatience 
The problem of 
 t
t
cdu
dθ
0  in Uzawa’s model arises because distant future levels of 
consumption have little influence on factors that form RTP; that is, RTP is formed only with the 
information on present consumption, and it must be revised every period in accordance with 
consumption growth. However, there is no a priori reason why information on distant future 
activities should be far less important than the information on the present and near future 
activities. Fisher (1930) argued that 
 
[O]ur first step, then, is to show how a person’s impatience depends on the size 
of his income, assuming the other three conditions to remain constant; for, 
evidently, it is possible that two incomes may have the same time shape, 
composition and risk, and yet differ in size, one being, say, twice the other in 
every period of time. 
 In general, it may be said that, other things being equal, the smaller the 
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income, the higher the preference for the present over the future income. It is 
true of course that a permanently small income implies a keen appreciation of 
wants as well as of immediate wants. … But it increases the want for immediate 
income even more than it increases the want for future income. (p. 72) 
 
According to Fisher’s (1930) view, a force that influences RTP is a psychological response 
derived from the perception of the “size of the entire income or utility stream.” This view 
indicates that it is necessary to probe how people perceive the size of the entire income or utility 
stream. 
 Little effort has been directed toward probing the nature of the size of the utility or 
income stream on RTP, although numerous psychological experiments have been performed 
with regard to the anomalies of the expected utility model with a constant RTP (e.g., Frederick 
et al., 2002). Analyses using endogenous RTP models so far have merely introduced the a priori 
assumption of endogeneity of RTP without explaining the reasoning for doing so in detail. 
Hence, even now, Fisher’s (1930) insights are very useful for the examination of the size effect. 
An important point in Fisher’s quote is that the size of the infinite utility stream is perceived as 
“permanently” high or low. The size difference among the utility streams may be perceived as a 
permanently continuing difference of utilities among different utility streams. Anticipation of a 
permanently higher utility may enhance an emotional sense of well-being because people feel 
they are in a long-lasting secure situation, which will generate a positive psychological response 
and make people more patient. If that is true, distant future utilities should be taken into account 
equally with present utility. Otherwise, it is impossible to distinguish whether the difference of 
utilities will continue permanently. 
 From this point of view, the specification that only the present utility influences the 
formation of RTP, as is the case of Uzawa’s model, is inadequate. Instead, a simple measure of 
the size where present and future utilities are summed with equal weight will be a more 
appropriate measure of the size of a utility stream.2 
 
A3.3  Model of RTP3 
A3.3.1  The model 
The representative household solves the maximization problem as shown in Section A1.1.3. 
Taking the arguments in Section A3.2 into account, the “size” of the infinite utility stream can 
be defined as follows. 
 
Definition 1: The size of the utility stream W for a given technology A is 
 
   
T
t
T
dtcutρEW
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lim , 
 
where E is the expectation operator, and 
 
 
T
tρ
1
  if Tt 0  
    0tρ   otherwise.                               
 
 tρ  indicates weights and has the same value in any period. Thus, the weights for the 
                                                          
2 Das (2003) showed another stable endogenous time preference model with decreasing impatience. Her model is 
stable, although the rate of time preference is decreasing because endogenous impatience is almost constant. In this 
sense, the situation her model describes is very special. 
3 The idea of this type of endogenous time preference model was originally presented in Harashima (2004). 
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evaluation of future utilities are distributed evenly over time, as discussed in Section A3.2. 
 To this point, technology A has been assumed to be constant. If A is temporally 
variable (At) and grows at a constant rate and the economy is on a balanced growth path such 
that At, yt, kt, and ct grow at the same rate, then the definition of W needs to be modified because 
any stream of ct and u(ct) grows to infinity. It is then impossible to distinguish the sizes of the 
utility stream by simply summing up ct as T  as shown in Definition 1. Because 
balanced growth is possible only when technological progress is Harrod neutral, I assume a 
Harrod neutral production function such that 
 
  1ttt kωAy , 
 
where  10   and  ωω 0  are constants. To distinguish the sizes of utility stream, 
the following value is set as the standard stream of utility, 
 
 ψtecu ~ , 
 
where  cc ~0~   is a constant and  ψψ 0  is a constant rate of growth. Streams of utility can 
be compared with this standard stream. If a constant relative risk aversion utility function is 
assumed, a stream of utility can be compared with the standard stream of utility as follows: 
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By using this ratio, a given stream of utility can be distinguished from the standard stream of 
utility. That is, the size of a utility stream W for a given stream of technology At that grows at 
the same rate ψ as yt, kt, and ct can be alternatively defined as 
 
  







T
ψt
t
T
dt
e
c
utρEW
0
lim . 
 
Clearly, if ψ = 0, then the size (W) degenerates into the one shown in Definition 1. 
 If there is a steady state such that 
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or for the case of expected balanced growth, 
 
  













cuE
e
c
uE
ψt
t
t
lim , 
 
where c* is a constant and indicates steady-state consumption, then 
 
   cuEW  
 
for the following reason. Because      

 cuEcuE t
t
lim (or 











 ψt
t
t e
c
uElim   cuE ), 
then 
 29 
 
            WcuEdtcuEcuEtρT t
T
 
 0lim  
(or         WcuEdt
e
c
uEcuEtρ
T
ψt
t
T



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














 
 0lim ). 
 
In addition, 
 
         0lim
0



dtcuEcuEtρ
T
t
T
 
(or      0lim
0




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




dt
e
c
uEcuEtρ
T
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t
T
). 
 
Hence,    cuEW ; that is, RTP is determined by steady-state consumption (c*). 
 The RTP model presented in this paper is constructed on the basis of this measure of W. 
An essential property that must be incorporated into the model is that RTP is sensitive to, and a 
function of, W such that 
 
 Wθθ  , 
 
where  Wθ   is monotonically continuous and continuously differentiable. Because W is a 
sum of utilities, this property simply reflects the core idea of an endogenous RTP. However, this 
property is new in the sense that RTP is sensitive not only to the present utility but also to the 
entire stream of utility, that is, the size of the utility stream represented by the utility of 
steady-state consumption. This property is intuitively acceptable because it is likely that people 
set their principles or parameters for their behaviors considering the final consequences of their 
behavior (i.e., the steady state; see, e.g., Barsky and Sims, 2012). 
 Another essential property that must be incorporated into the model is 
 
0
dW
dθ
. 
 
Because    cuEW  and  
t
t
dc
cdu
0 , RTP is inversely proportionate to c*. This property is 
consistent with the findings in many empirical studies, which have shown that RTP is negatively 
correlated with permanent income (e.g., Lawrance, 1991). 
 In summary, the basic structure of the model is: 
 
        cuEθWθθ  , 
   0 cudE
dθ
dW
dθ
 .                          (A14) 
 
This model is deceptively similar to Uzawa’s endogenous RTP model and simply replaces ct 
with c* and 
 t
t
cdu
dθ
0  with    0cudE
dθ
. However, the two models are completely different 
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because of the opposite characteristics of 
 t
t
cdu
dθ
0  and    0cudE
dθ
. 
 
A3.3.2  Nature of the model 
The model can be regarded as successful only if it exhibits stability. In Uzawa’s model, the 
economy becomes unstable if 
 t
t
cdu
dθ
0  is replaced with 
 
0
t
t
cdu
dθ
. In this section, I 
examine the stability of the model. 
 
A3.3.2.1  Equilibrium RTP 
In Ramsey-type models, such as shown in Section A1.1.3, if a constant RTP is given, the value 
of the marginal product of capital (i.e., the value of the real interest rate) converges to that of the 
given RTP as the economy approaches the steady state. Hence, when a RTP is specified at a 
certain value, the corresponding expected steady-state consumption is uniquely determined. 
Given fixed values of other exogenous parameters, any predetermined RTP has unique values of 
expected consumption and utility at steady state. There is a one-to-one correspondence between 
the expected utilities at steady state and the RTPs; therefore, the expected utility at steady state 
can be expressed as a function of RTP. Let 

xc  be a set of steady-state consumption levels, 
given a set of RTPs (θx) and other fixed exogenous parameters. The concept of θ → W 
discussed above can be described as 
 
      WcuEθg    ,                       (A15) 
 
where  xcc  and xθθ . On the other hand, RTP is a continuous function of steady-state 
consumption as shown in equation (A14) such that        cuEθWθθ . The 
reverse function is 
 
     WcuEθh   .                        (A16) 
 
 The equilibrium RTP is determined by the point of intersection of the two functions, 
 θg  and  θh , as shown in Figure A1. Figure A2 shows the special but conventionally 
assumed case for  θh  in which θ is not sensitive to W, and RTP is constant. There exists a 
point of intersection because both  θg  and  θh  are monotonically continuous for 0θ . 
 θh  is monotonically continuous because  Wθ   is monotonically continuous.  θg  is 
monotonically continuous because, as a result of utility maximization,    k fc  and 
 



dk
kdf 
 θ , where 
k  is capital input per capita at steady state such that  t
t
kk

  lim . 
Because  k f  and  


dk
kdf 
 are monotonically continuous for 0k , c* is a 
monotonically continuous function of θ for 0θ . Here, because u is monotonically 
continuous, then     θgcuE   is also monotonically continuous for 0θ . 
 The function      WcuEθg    is a decreasing function of θ because higher RTP 
results in lower steady state consumption. The function      WcuEθh    is also a 
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decreasing function of θ because 0
dW
dθ
. Thus, both  θg  and  θh  are decreasing, but 
the slope of  θh  is steeper than that of  θg  as shown in Figure A1. This is true because 
  Wθg  is the consequence of a Ramsey-type model as shown in Section A1.1.3; thus, if 
θ , then   0Wθg  because  tiθ  and 0tk , and if 0θ , then 
  Wθg  because 0 tiθ  and tk . The function   Wθh  indicates the 
endogeneity of RTP, and because RTP is usually neither zero nor infinity, then even if 
  0Wθh , θ , and   Wθh , θ0 . Hence, the locus   Wθh  cuts the 
locus   Wθg   downward from the top, as shown in Figure A1. Hence, the locus   Wθh   
is more vertical than   Wθg  , and thereby  a permanently constant RTP, as shown in Figure 
A2, has probably been used as an approximation of the locus   Wθh  for simplicity.  
 
A3.3.2.2  Stability of the model 
RTP is constant unless a shock that changes the expected c* occurs because W does not depend 
on t but on the expected c*. Thus, the same RTP and steady state continue until such a shock 
hits the economy. Therefore, the endogeneity of RTP only matters when a shock occurs. This 
constancy is the key for the stability of the model. Once the RTP corresponding to the 
intersection (Fig. 1) is determined, it is constant and the economy converges at a unique steady 
state unless a shock that changes the expected c* occurs. The shock is exogenous to the model, 
and the economy does not explode endogenously but stabilizes at the steady state. Hence, the 
property 0
dW
dθ
 in the model, which is consistent with empirical findings, does not cause 
instability. 
 The model is therefore acceptable as a model of endogenous RTP. Furthermore, 
because RTP is endogenously determined, the assumption of irrationality is not necessary for 
the determination of RTP. Nevertheless, a shock on RTP can be initiated by a shock on the 
expected c*; thus, even if the so-called animal spirits are directly irrelevant to determination of 
RTP, they may be relevant in the generation of shocks on the expected c*. 
 
A4  Frequent RTP shocks 
A4.1  Difficulty in knowing RTP RH  
To estimate the parameter values of equation (A16) in the structural model of RTP RH, it is 
necessary to obtain a sufficiently large amount of data on the value of RTP RH. To obtain these 
data, a household must know the RTPs of all the other households. Although a household knows 
its own RTP, it has almost no information about the RTPs of all the other households much less 
time-series data on each household’s RTP. Because of the lack of available data, a household 
cannot estimate the parameter values in equation (A16) in the structural model of RTP RH even 
if it knows the functional forms of equations in the structural model.  
We can easily generate data on aggregate consumption, investment, production, 
inflation, trade, and other factors at a relatively low cost, but we cannot directly observe the 
value of RTP RH. Nonetheless, many estimates of RTP have been reported, but they are not 
based on a structural model of RTP. Most are the results of experimental studies or indirect 
estimates based on other models (e.g., Ramsey growth models) on the assumption that RTP is 
constant. Experiments can give us some information on the RTPs of test subjects, but we should 
not naively use these estimates as the RTP RH in the calculation of the future path of economy 
because they vary widely according to the experimental environments. Furthermore, most of the 
indirect estimates were calculated on the assumption that RTP is constant, which as discussed 
previously, is most likely not the case. The basic problem is that no credible estimation method 
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of RTP RH has been established. 
 
A4.2  Expectations based on beliefs 
The lack of observable data on RTP RH will significantly hinder households from generating 
rational expectations of the future path of economy. How do households rationally expect their 
future streams of consumption and production and calculate their optimal paths without 
information on RTP RH, which is indispensable as the discount factor? The historical mean of 
RTP RH estimated by long-term data is not consistent with a rational expectation of the future 
stream because RTP is not constant. Without a reliable method for estimating the parameters of 
the structural model, it is impossible for households to generate rational expectations of the 
future path of the economy. 
 An alternative way of estimating expected values of RTP RH is needed, but even if an 
alternative method is utilized, households still have to behave as rationally as possible even in 
an environment of significantly incomplete information. In this situation, household may have 
to use the concept of bounded rationality to make decisions. It is possible that the only 
alternative for a household is to use its “belief” about the RTP RH. The use of a belief does not 
mean that households deviate from rationality; rather, it is the most rational behavior they can 
use in an environment where insufficient information is available. 
 Such a belief is defined in this paper as the range of values of RTP RH within which a 
household believes that the true RTP RH exists. Households utilize the belief in place of 
equation (A16). More specifically, suppose that household i ( Ni ) believes that the RTP RH 
in the future is situated in the range λi, where the subjective probability density at any point on λi 
is identical (i.e., its distribution shape is uniform). Because households have no information 
about the shape of the distribution, they assume that it is uniform. This supposition means that 
household i believes that λi is stationary. Let iλ be the mean of λi. Suppose that household i 
calculates its optimal future path on the belief that the mean of future values of RTP RH is
iλ . 
By equation (A15), W can be calculated based on 
iλ , and the expected future path of economy 
can be calculated. 
 Households can equally access all relevant information. Therefore, if the belief of a 
household is very different from those of the majority, the household will soon perceive that its 
belief is different, through observing the behavior of majority. The household will change its 
belief to the almost same as those of the majority because otherwise it cannot achieve optimality 
as expected on the assumption that sustainable heterogeneity is achieved. Hence, it is likely that 
households’ beliefs become similar, and thereby, it is assumed for simplicity that households’ 
beliefs are identical.  
 Note that households do not cooperatively and collectively expect the future path of 
economy (i.e., the representative household’s future path), but each household independently 
and individually generates its own expectations based on its belief in RTP RH. The household 
thereby creates its own expected future path considering the expected representative 
household’s future path. The aggregates are the sum of all household’s independent and 
individual activities, but if sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, the aggregates appear to be the 
same as the results of the representative household’s activities. 
 
A4.3  Refining beliefs 
A household knows that its expectation is based on its beliefs and not the structural model. 
Therefore, it will always want to refine the belief, that is, raise the probability that the belief is 
the correct value, by exploiting all currently available relevant information. Let a set of 
currently available economic indicators be It (e.g., the observed data on consumption, 
production, inventory, etc.). These data may provide some useful information on the past RTP 
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RH, and a household may refine its belief based on this information. These data and equation 
(A15) can be used to generate estimates of past values of RTP RH. However, It includes noise, 
and data in It will usually be somewhat inconsistent between the elements of It. In addition, 
because equation (A15) indicates the steady state values that are achieved after a long-period 
transition, the short-term past data included in It are basically insufficient to obtain a credible 
estimate. Therefore, the estimate of the past values of RTP RH based on It and equation (A15) 
will usually have a large confidence interval. Let 
Iμ  be the estimated past RTP RH and μI be 
its confidence interval of, for example, 95%. Because households can equally access all relevant 
information, assume for simplicity that μI and Iμ are identical for all households. 
 Although a household knows that 
Iμ  is not a credible estimate, has a large 
confidence interval, and is merely an estimate (usually a point estimate) of a past value, it will 
strive to utilize the information derived from
Iμ to refine its beliefs in the future value of RTP 
RH. Usually
Iμ will not be equal to iλ , but the ranges of λi and μI may partly overlap. Household 
i may utilize the information from this partial overlap to refine its belief (i.e., information of 
how λi is different from μI). iI λμ   indicates that the belief iλ  is wrong, Iμ is wrong, both 
are wrong, or both are right if the true past RTP RH is
Iμ but the true future RTP RH is iλ . The 
belief 
iλ  may be wrong because the RTP RH will change in the near future, and Iμ may be 
wrong because the RTP RH changed during the period in which the data were obtained. In 
addition, a household knows that μI is the result of all households’ activities based on their 
beliefs, not on the true value of RTP RH. These uncertainties arise because households cannot 
know the parameters of the structural model. Without using the structural model, household i 
cannot judge whether 
iλ  is wrong, Iμ is wrong, both are wrong, or both are right. As a result, 
household i will not easily adjust its belief from 
iλ  to Iμ . 
 However, it is still likely that information about the difference between λi and μI can be 
used to refine the belief. To extract the useful information, the following rules may be used:  
 
Rule 1: if 
Iμ is included in λi, the belief is not adjusted; otherwise, the belief is adjusted from 
iλ  to Iμ . 
Rule 2: if 
iλ is included in μI, the belief is not adjusted; otherwise, the belief is adjusted from 
iλ  to Iμ . 
Rule 3: if λi and μI overlap at or above a specified ratio, the belief is not adjusted; otherwise, the 
belief is adjusted from 
iλ  to Iμ . 
 
The above rules may be seen as a type of adaptive expectation because μI indicates the past RTP 
RH. However, in the situation where the parameters of the structural model of the RTP RH are 
unknown, it may be seen as rational to utilize the information contained in μI by adopting one of 
these rules. 
 
A4.4  Changing beliefs 
However, it does not seem likely that a household will refine its belief following one of the rules 
shown above because the rules are basically backward looking and will not be adopted as a tool 
for refining the belief if a household is convinced that the RTP RH is temporally variable. The 
belief will only be changed if forward-looking information is available, that is, when a 
household becomes aware of information about the future RTP RH in μI. For example, the 
difference between λi and μI may reflect an unexpected and large positive technology shock that 
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occurred after the formation of belief λi. Because the effects of the technology shock will persist 
for long periods in the future, household i will most likely change its belief. In this case, a 
household will not simply refine its belief from 
iλ  to Iμ ; it will change to another value that 
is formed as an entirely new belief. 
 Whether a household changes its belief or not, therefore, will depend not simply on μI 
but on the information the household can extract from μI about the future path of the economy. 
Hence, in some cases, a household will change its belief when new values of μI are obtained, but 
in other cases, it will not, depending on how the household interprets the information contained 
in μI. 
 
A4.5  Heuristics 
When a household interprets μI, it may also use heuristic methods, for example, a simplified 
linear reduced form model of RTP RH. Studies of the use of heuristics and bounded rationality 
in this context would be useful for better understanding the interpretation mechanism of μI. 
There are many possible simplified linear reduced form models of RH’s RTP that could be used 
as heuristic methods although most of them may be ad hoc. Even though such reduced form 
models are far less credible than a structural model, they may be utilized as a heuristic method 
of interpreting μI by households. Although these types of models may often result in misleading 
conclusions, they may sometimes provide useful information. For example, if a linear 
correlation between RTP RH and a financial indicator exists, even if it is weak or temporary, 
changes in the financial indicator may contain useful information about changes in the RTP RH. 
Therefore, if a household believes that this correlation exists, it will use this information to 
interpret μI. 
 
A4.6  Frequent RTP shocks 
Households must have expected values of RTP RH for sustainable heterogeneity, but as 
previously discussed, the expectations are not based on the structural model but rather on a 
belief that is not guaranteed to generate the correct value. In addition, the belief can be 
influenced by heuristic considerations. These features indicate that the expected values of RTP 
RH will fluctuate more frequently than the intrinsic RTP RH. 
 Households’ expectations of RTP RH will change when the intrinsic RTP RH shifts, 
for example, when new information about shocks on the factors that determine equation (A15) 
becomes available. For a given θ,   cuE changes if the expectation of future productivity 
changes. Productivity at the macro level will be influenced by scientific technology, financial 
technology, social infrastructure, and other factors. If expectations about these factors in the 
future changes, the expected future productivity and   cuE will also change. In addition, 
even if intrinsic RTP RH does not change, the expected RTP RH will change if a household’s 
belief is altered because of new information contained in μI. Hence, the expected RTP RH can 
change independently of intrinsic changes in RTP RH. Therefore, even if intrinsic changes in 
RTP RH occur infrequently, changes in the expected RTP RH may occur more frequently. 
 A household’s expected RTP RH can potentially change every time new information 
on μI becomes available if it contains the information that makes beliefs change. Information 
concerning factors that affect the expected RTP RH will become available frequently, and at 
least some of the information may be both very important and unexpected. In addition, there 
will be many disturbances in the fundamental factors that affect equation (A15), and many of 
these disturbances will also cause μI to change. As discussed previously, a household may 
interpret these changes in μI as a change in the true RTP RH. Therefore, it is likely that 
households’ expected RTP RH change more frequently than the intrinsic RTP RH, and thereby, 
that time preference shocks also occur more frequently than previously thought. 
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 Even a small piece of additional information about the belief can significantly change 
the path of the economy. For example, if many households believe a rumor (whether it is true or 
not) related to information about the interpretation of μI and respond similarly to it, their 
expectations will be changed in the same direction by the rumor. If all households respond 
similarly to an untrue rumor and change their expectations equally to an untrue value, the 
economy will proceed based on the incorrect expectation of RTP RH. The
Iμ that is observed a 
few periods later will follow these wrongly expected values of RTP RH. Upon obtaining new 
data of 
Iμ that are consistent with these wrongly expected values, households will judge that 
their (incorrect) changes were in fact correct. As a result, the incorrect expectations become 
self-fulfilling. This spurious situation may reach an impasse at some point in the future because 
the expectations are based not on a structural model but on the (incorrect) beliefs. Households 
will not anticipate the impasse until the economy reaches it because they believe that the 
wrongly expected RTP RH (i.e., the currently held belief) is true. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
The NASH Equilibrium of a Pareto Inefficient Path 
 
B1  Model with non-cooperative households 4 
B1.1  The shock 
The model describes the utility maximization of households after an upward time preference 
shock. This shock was chosen because it is one of the few shocks that result in a Nash 
equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path. Another important reason for selecting an upward time 
preference shock is that it shifts the steady state to lower levels of production and consumption 
than before the shock, which is consistent with the phenomena actually observed in a recession.  
  Although the rate of time preference is a deep parameter, it has not been regarded as a 
source of shocks for economic fluctuations, possibly because the rate of time preference is 
thought to be constant and not to shift suddenly. There is also a practical reason, however. 
Models with a permanently constant rate of time preference exhibit excellent tractability (see 
Samuelson, 1937). However, the rate of time preference has been naturally assumed and 
actually observed to be time-variable. The concept of a time-varying rate of time preference has 
a long history (e.g., Böhm-Bawerk, 1889; Fisher, 1930). More recently, Lawrance (1991) and 
Becker and Mulligan (1997) showed that people do not inherit permanently constant rates of 
time preference by nature and that economic and social factors affect the formation of time 
preference rates. Their arguments indicate that many incidents can affect and change the rate of 
time preference throughout a person’s life. For example, Parkin (1988) examined business 
cycles in the United States, explicitly considering the time-variability of the time preference rate, 
and showed that the rate of time preference was as volatile as technology and leisure preference.  
 
B1.2  Households 
Households are not intrinsically cooperative. Except in a strict communist economy, households 
do not coordinate themselves to behave as a single entity when consuming goods and services. 
The model in this paper assumes non-cooperative, identical, and infinitely long living 
households and that the number of households is sufficiently large. Each of them equally 
maximizes the expected utility 
 
     dtcuθtE t


0
0 exp  , 
 
subject to 
 
    ttt
t cδkkA,f
dt
dk
  , 
 
where yt, ct, and kt are production, consumption, and capital per capita in period t, respectively; 
A is technology and constant; u is the utility function;  tt kAfy ,  is the production 
function;   >θ 0 is the rate of time preference; δ is the rate of depreciation; and E0 is the 
expectations operator conditioned on the agents’ period 0 information set. yt, ct, and kt are 
monotonically continuous and differentiable in t, and u and f are monotonically continuous 
functions of ct and kt, respectively. All households initially have an identical amount of financial 
                                                          
4 The model in Section B1 is based on the model by Harashima (2012). See also Harashima (2004, 2013b). 
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assets equal to kt, and all households gain the identical amount of income  tt kAfy ,  in each 
period. It is assumed that 
 
0
t
t
dc
cdu
 and 
 
0
2
2

t
t
dc
cud
; thus, households are risk averse. For 
simplicity, the utility function is specified to be the constant relative risk aversion utility 
function  
 
                             
γ
c
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γ
t
t



1
1
   if 1γ  
                               tt ccu ln    if 1γ  , 
 
where γ is a constant and  γ0 . In addition, 
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0
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

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t
t
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kf
. Both 
technology (A) and labor supply are assumed to be constant. 
 The effects of an upward shift in time preference are shown in Figure B1. Suppose 
first that the economy is at steady state before the shock. After the upward time preference 
shock, the vertical line 0
dt
dct  moves to the left (from the solid vertical line to the dashed 
vertical line in Fig. 1). To keep Pareto efficiency, consumption needs to jump immediately from 
the steady state before the shock (the prior steady state) to point Z. After the jump, consumption 
proceeds on the Pareto efficient saddle path after the shock (the posterior Pareto efficient saddle 
path) from point Z to the lower steady state after the shock (the posterior steady state). 
Nevertheless, this discontinuous jump to Z may be uncomfortable for risk-averse households 
that wish to smooth consumption and not to experience substantial fluctuations. Households 
may instead take a shortcut and, for example, proceed on a path on which consumption is 
reduced continuously from the prior steady state to the posterior steady state (the bold dashed 
line in Fig. 1), but this shortcut is not Pareto efficient. 
  Choosing a Pareto inefficient consumption path must be consistent with each 
household’s maximization of its expected utility. To examine the possibility of the rational 
choice of a Pareto inefficient path, the expected utilities between the two options need be 
compared. For this comparison, I assume that there are two options for each non-cooperative 
household with regard to consumption just after an upward shift in time preference. The first is 
a jump option, J, in which a household’s consumption jumps to Z and then proceeds on the 
posterior Pareto efficient saddle path to the posterior steady state. The second is a non-jump 
option, NJ, in which a household’s consumption does not jump but instead gradually decreases 
from the prior steady state to the posterior steady state, as shown by the bold dashed line in 
Figure B1. The household that chooses the NJ option reaches the posterior steady state in period 
 0s . The difference in consumption between the two options in each period t is bt (≥ 0). Thus, 
b0 indicates the difference between Z and the prior steady state. bt diminishes continuously and 
becomes zero in period s. The NJ path of consumption (ct) after the shock is monotonically 
continuous and differentiable in t and 0
dt
dct  if st 0 . In addition,  
 
                             
tt ccc ˆ    if st 0  
                             cct        if ts 0  ,  
 
where tcˆ  is consumption when proceeding on the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path and c  
is consumption in the posterior steady state. Therefore, 
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                          0ˆ  ttt ccb    if st 0  
                          0tb             if ts 0  . 
 
  It is also assumed that, when a household chooses a different option from the one the 
other households choose, the difference in the accumulation of financial assets resulting from 
the difference in consumption (bt) before period s between that household and the other 
households is reflected in consumption after period s. That is, the difference in the return on 
financial assets is added to (or subtracted from) the household’s consumption in each period 
after period s. The exact functional form of the addition (or subtraction) is shown in Section 
B1.4. 
 
B1.3  Firms 
Unutilized products (bt) are eliminated quickly in each period by firms because holding bt for a 
long period is a cost to firms. Elimination of bt is accomplished by discarding the goods or 
preemptively suspending production, thereby leaving some capital and labor inputs idle. 
However, in the next period, unutilized products are generated again because the economy is not 
proceeding on the Pareto efficient saddle path. Unutilized products are therefore successively 
generated and eliminated. Faced with these unutilized products, firms dispose of the excess 
capital used to generate bt. Disposing of the excess capital is rational for firms because the 
excess capital is an unnecessary cost, but this means that parts of the firms are liquidated, which 
takes time and thus disposing of the excess capital will also take time. If the economy proceeds 
on the NJ path (that is, if all households choose the NJ option), firms dispose of all of the 
remaining excess capital that generates bt and adjust their capital to the posterior steady-state 
level in period s, which also corresponds to households reaching the posterior steady state. Thus, 
if the economy proceeds on the NJ path, capital kt is 
 
                            
tt kkk
ˆ    if st 0  
                            kkt        if ts 0  , 
 
where tkˆ  is capital per capita when proceeding on the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path 
and k  is capital per capita in the posterior steady state. 
  The real interest rate it is  
 
  
 
t
t
t
k
kAf
i



,
 . 
 
Because the real interest rate equals the rate of time preference at steady state, if the economy 
proceeds on the NJ path, 
 
                             θiθ t 
~
  if st 0  
                             θit       if ts 0  ,                       
 
where θ
~
 is the rate of time preference before the shock and θ  is the rate of time preference 
after the shock. 
ti  is monotonically continuous and differentiable in t if st 0 . 
 
B1.4  Expected utility after the shock 
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The expected utility of a household after the shock depends on its choice of the J or NJ path. Let 
Jalone indicate that the household chooses option J, but the other households choose option NJ; 
NJalone indicate that the household chooses option NJ, but the other households choose option 
J; Jtogether indicate that all households choose option J; and NJtogether indicate that all 
households choose option NJ. Let p (0 ≤ p ≤ 1) be the subjective probability of a household that 
the other households choose the J option (e.g., p = 0 indicates that all the other households 
choose option NJ). With p, the expected utility of a household when it chooses option J is  
 
       JaloneEpJtogetherpEJE 000 1  ,              (B1) 
 
and when it chooses option NJ is 
 
     00 pENJE  (NJalone)+    NJtogetherEp 01  ,            (B2) 
 
where  JaloneE0 ,  NJaloneE0 ,  JtogetherE0 , and  NJtogetherE0  are the expected 
utilities of the household when choosing Jalone, NJalone, Jtogether, and NJtogether, 
respectively. Given the properties of J and NJ shown in Sections B1.2 and B1.3, 
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tt dtcuθtdtbcuθtpEJE ˆexpexp
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   
s
s
tt dtacuθtdtbcuθtEp
0
0 expexp1  ,    (B3) 
 
and 
 
         



   
s
s
ttt dtacuθtdtcuθtpENJE
0
00
ˆexpexp  
         



  

s
s
t dtcuθtdtcuθtEp expexp1
0
0
 ,         (B4) 
 
where 
 
 
s s
r
qr drdqibθa
0
exp  ,                      (B5) 
 
and  
 
 
s s
r
qrtt drdqibia
0
exp  ,                     (B6) 
 
and the shock occurred in period t = 0. Figure B2 shows the paths of Jalone and NJalone. 
Because there is a sufficiently large number of households and the effect of an individual 
household on the whole economy is negligible, in the case of Jalone, the economy almost 
proceeds on the NJ path. Similarly, in the case of NJalone, it almost proceeds on the J path. If 
the other households choose the NJ option (Jalone or NJtogether), consumption after s is 
constant as c  and capital is adjusted to k  by firms in period s. In addition, at and it are 
constant after s such that at equals a  and is equals θ, because the economy is at the posterior 
steady state. Nevertheless, during the transition period before s, the value of it changes from the 
value of the prior time preference rate to that of the posterior rate. If the other households 
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choose option J (NJalone or Jtogether), however, consumption after s is 
tcˆ  and capital is not 
adjusted to k  by firms in period s and remains at tkˆ . 
  As mentioned in Section B1.2, the difference in the returns on financial assets for the 
household from the returns for each of the other households is added to (or subtracted from) its 
consumption in each period after period s. This is described by at and a  in equations (B3) and 
(B4), and equations (B5) and (B6) indicate that the accumulated difference in financial assets 
resulting from bt increases by compound interest between the period r to s. That is, if the 
household takes the NJalone path, it accumulates more financial assets than each of the other J 
households, and instead of immediately consuming these extra accumulated financial assets 
after period s, the household consumes the returns on them in every subsequent period. If the 
household takes the Jalone path, however, its consumption after s is ac  , as shown in 
equation (B3). a  is subtracted because the income of each household,  tt kAfy , , 
including the Jalone household, decreases equally by bt. Each of the other NJ households 
decreases consumption by bt at the same time, which compensates for the decrease in income; 
thus, its financial assets (i.e., capital per capita; kt) are kept equal to tkˆ . The Jalone household, 
however, does not decrease its consumption, and its financial assets become smaller than those 
of each of the other NJ households, which results in the subtraction of a  after period s. 
 
B2  Pareto inefficient transition path 5 
B2.1  Rational Pareto inefficient path  
B2.1.1  Rational choice of a Pareto inefficient path 
Before examining the economy with non-cooperative households, I first show that, if 
households are cooperative, only option J is chosen as the path after the shock because it gives a 
higher expected utility than option NJ. Because there is no possibility of Jalone and NJalone if 
households are cooperative, then    JtogetherEJE 00   and    NJtogetherENJE 00  . 
Therefore,  
 
     NJEJE 00   
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                
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
s
t
s
ttt dtcucuθtdtcubcuθtE ˆexpexp
0
0
 > 0 
 
because 
ttt bcc   and tcc ˆ . 
  Next, I examine the economy with non-cooperative households. First, the special case 
with a utility function with a sufficiently small γ is examined.  
 
Lemma 1: If   γγ 0  is sufficiently small, then     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE .  
Proof:     NJtogetherEJaloneE
γ
00
0
lim 

 
              

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s
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γ
dtcuacuθtEdtcubcuθtE
0 0
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0 limexplimexp  
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s
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0
00 expexp  
                                                          
5 The idea of a rationally chosen Pareto inefficient path was originally presented by Harashima (2004). 
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because, if  st 0 , then θit   and    
s
t
q dqitsθ expexp . Hence, because   tsθ exp  

s
t
q dqiexp ,     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  for sufficiently small γ.               ■ 
 
  Second, the opposite special case (i.e., a utility function with a sufficiently large γ) is 
examined.  
 
Lemma 2: If   γγ 0  is sufficiently large and if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
, then  JaloneE0  
  00 NJtogetherE . 
Proof: Because 
tb0 , then  
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for any period  st  . On the other hand, because a0 , then for any period  st  , if 
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Thus,  
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1
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
γc
γ
 for any   γγ 1 , then if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
,    NJtogetherEJaloneE 00   
< 0 for sufficiently large  γ .                                               ■ 
 
The condition 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
 indicates that path NJ from c0 to c  deviates sufficiently from 
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the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path and reaches the posterior steady state c  not taking 
much time. Because steady states are irrelevant to the degree of risk aversion (γ), both c0 and c  
are irrelevant to γ.  
 By Lemmas 1 and 2, it can be proved that     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  is 
possible. 
 
Lemma 3: If 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
, then there is a    γγ 0  such that if  γγ , 
    000  NJtogetherEJaloneE . 
Proof: If  0γ  is sufficiently small, then     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  by Lemma 1, 
and if  γ  is sufficiently large and if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
, then    NJtogetherEJaloneE 00   
0  by Lemma 2. Hence, if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
, there is a certain    γγ 0  such that, if 
 γγ , then     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE .                                ■ 
 
  However,     000  NJaloneEJtogetherE  because both Jtogether and NJalone 
indicate that all the other households choose option J; thus, the values of it and kt are the same as 
those when all households proceed on the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path. Faced with 
these it and kt, deviating alone from the Pareto efficient path (NJalone) gives a lower expected 
utility than Jtogether to the NJ household. Both Jalone and NJtogether indicate that all the other 
households choose option NJ and it and kt are not those of the Pareto efficient path. Hence, the 
sign of    NJtogetherEJaloneE 00   varies depending on the conditions, as Lemma 3 
indicates.  
  By Lemma 3 and the property     000  NJaloneEJtogetherE , the possibility of 
the choice of a Pareto inefficient transition path, that is,     000  NJEJE , is shown. 
 
Proposition 1: If 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
 and  γγ , then there is a  10   pp  such that if 
*pp  ,     000  NJEJE , and if 
*pp  ,     000  NJEJE . 
Proof: By Lemma 3, if  γγ , then     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  and  JtogetherE0  
  00  NJaloneE . By equations (B1) and (B2),  
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. Hence, by the intermediate value 
theorem, there is  10   pp  such that if *pp  ,     000  NJEJE  and if *pp  , 
    000  NJEJE .                                                             ■ 
 
Proposition 1 indicates that, if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
,  γγ , and p < p*, then the choice of option 
NJ gives the higher expected utility than that of option J to a household; that is, a household 
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may make the rational choice of taking a Pareto inefficient transition path. The lemmas and 
proposition require no friction, so a Pareto inefficient transition path can be chosen even in a 
frictionless economy. This result is very important because it offers counter-evidence against 
the conjecture that households never rationally choose a Pareto inefficient transition path in a 
frictionless economy. 
 
B2.1.2  Conditions for a rational Pareto inefficient path 
The proposition requires several conditions. Among them,  γγ  may appear rather strict. 
If γ* is very large, path NJ will rarely be chosen. However, if path NJ is such that consumption 
is reduced sharply after the shock, the NJ option yields a higher expected utility than the J 
option even though γ is very small. For example, for any   γγ 0 , 
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s
s
ttt dtcuacuθtEdtcubcuθtE expexp 0
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As γ increases, the ratio 
   
   bθscucu
cubcu ss


 decreases; thus, larger values of s can satisfy 
    000  NJtogetherEJaloneE . For example, suppose that c = 10, cs = 10.2, b = 0.3, and θ 
= 0.05. If 1γ , then s* = 1.5 at the minimum, and if 5γ , then s* = 6.8 at the minimum. This 
result implies that, if option NJ is such that consumption is reduced relatively sharply after the 
shock (e.g., bbt  ) and 
*pp  , option NJ will usually be chosen. Choosing option NJ is not a 
special case observed only if γ is very large, but option NJ can normally be chosen when the 
value of γ is within usually observed values. Conditions for generating a rational Pareto 
inefficient transition path therefore are not strict. In a recession, consumption usually declines 
sharply after the shock, which suggests that households have chosen the NJ option. 
 
B3  Nash equilibrium 
B3.1  A Nash equilibrium consisting of NJ strategies  
A household strategically determines whether to choose the J or NJ option, considering other 
households’ choices. All households know that each of them forms expectations about the future 
values of its utility and makes a decision in the same manner. Since all households are identical, 
the best response of each household is identical. Suppose that there are  NΗ   identical 
households in the economy where H is sufficiently large (as assumed in Section B1). Let 
 10  ηη qq  be the probability that a household  Ηη   chooses option J. The average 
utility of the other households almost equals that of all households because H is sufficiently 
large. Hence, the average expected utilities of the other households that choose the J and NJ 
options are E0(Jtogether) and E0(NJtogether), respectively. Hence, the payoff matrix of the 
Η-dimensional symmetric mixed strategy game can be described as shown in Table B1. Each 
identical household determines its behavior on the basis of this payoff matrix.  
 In this mixed strategy game, the strategy profiles  
 
(q1,q2,…,qH) = {(1,1,…,1), ( *** ,...,, ppp ), (0,0,…,0)} 
 
are Nash equilibria for the following reason. By Proposition 1, the best response of household η 
is J (i.e., qη = 1) if 
*pp  , indifferent between J and NJ (i.e., any  10,qη  ) if 
*pp  , and NJ 
(i.e., qη = 0) if 
*pp  . Because all households are identical, the best-response correspondence 
of each household is identical such that qη = 1 if 
*pp  , [0,1] if *pp  , and 0 if *pp   for 
any household Ηη . Hence, the mixed strategy profiles (1, 1,…,1), ( *** ,...,, ppp ), and 
(0,0,…,0) are the intersections of the graph of the best-response correspondences of all 
households. The Pareto efficient saddle path solution (1,1,…,1) (i.e., Jtogether) is a pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium, but a Pareto inefficient transition path (0,0,…,0) ( i.e., NJtogether) is 
also a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In addition, there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium 
( *** ,...,, ppp ).  
 
B3.2  Selection of equilibrium 
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Determining which Nash equilibrium, either NJtogether (0,0,…,0) or Jtogether (1,1,…,1), is 
dominant requires refinements of the Nash equilibrium, which necessitate additional criteria. 
Here, if households have a risk-averse preference in the sense that they avert the worst scenario 
when its probability is not known, households suppose a very low p and select the NJtogether 
(0,0,…,0) equilibrium. Because 
 
               NJaloneEJaloneE 00   
               dtacuacuθtdtcubcuθtE s
s
ttttt 


0
0
ˆexpexp  
                         


s
s
ttt dtcuacuθtdtcubcuθtE
0
0 expexp  
          = E0 (Jalone) – E0 (NJtogether) < 0 ,                           (B7) 
 
by Lemma 3, Jalone is the worst choice in terms of the amount of payoff, followed by 
NJtogether, and NJalone, and Jtogether is the best. The outcomes of choosing option J are more 
dispersed than those of option NJ. If households have a risk-averse preference in the 
above-mentioned sense and avert the worst scenario when they have no information on its 
probability, a household will prefer the less dispersed option (NJ), fearing the worst situation 
that the household alone substantially increases consumption while the other households 
substantially decrease consumption after the shock. This behavior is rational because it is 
consistent with preferences. Because all households are identical and know inequality (B7), all 
households will equally suppose that they all prefer the less dispersed NJ option; therefore, all 
of them will suppose a very low p, particularly 0p , and select the NJtogether (0,0,…,0) 
equilibrium, which is the Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path. Thereby, unlike most 
multiple equilibria models, the problem of indeterminacy does not arise, and “animal spirits” 
(e.g., pessimism or optimism) are unnecessary to explain the selection. 
 
B4  Amplified generation of unutilized resources 
A Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path successively generates unutilized products (bt). 
They are left unused, discarded, or preemptively not produced during the path. Unused or 
discarded goods and services indicate a decline in sales and an increase in inventory for firms. 
Preemptively suspended production results in an increase in unemployment and idle capital. As 
a result, profits decline and some parts of firms need to be liquidated, which is unnecessary if 
the economy proceeds on the J path (i.e., the posterior Pareto efficient path). If the liquidation is 
implemented immediately after the shock, bt will no longer be generated, but such a liquidation 
would generate a tremendous shock. The process of the liquidation, however, will take time 
because of various frictions, and excess capital that generates bt will remain for a long period. 
During the period when capital is not reduced to the posterior steady-state level, unutilized 
products are successively generated. In a period, bt is generated and eliminated, but in the next 
period, another, new, bt is generated and eliminated. This cycle is repeated in every period 
throughout the transition path, and it implies that demand is lower than supply in every period. 
This phenomenon may be interpreted as a general glut or a persisting disequilibrium by some 
definitions of equilibrium. 
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Figure A1: Endogenous time preference 
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Figure A2: Permanently constant time preference 
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Figure B2: The paths of Jalone and NJalone 
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Figure B3: A Pareto inefficient transition path 
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Table B1  The payoff matrix 
 
              Any other household 
  J  NJ  
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 A
       
J  E0(Jtogether), E0(Jtogether) E0(Jalone), E0(NJtogether) 
      
NJ  E0(NJalone), E0(Jtogether) E0(NJtogether), E0(NJtogether) 
 
 
 
